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INTRODUCTION

Karl Llewellyn observed that the "skills" lawyers use in their work
do not differ from the ordinary skills of all human interaction.1 The
truth of this observation may be obscured by the labels imposed on
various lawyering activities. For example, lawyers asking questions
are "interviewing," "cross-examining," or "taking a deposition," depending on the context; lawyers' speeches are called "oral argument"
or "opening statement"; and lawyers discussing the resolution of a

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati; LL.M. 1985, Georgetown; J.D. 1982,
University of Virginia; B.A. 1978, Rutgers College.
**Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1972, Harvard; B.A. 1969, University of
Cincinnati.
The authors are grateful to their research assistant Robin Smith, to their colleagues Robert
Martineau, Joseph Tomain, and David Reiser, who read earlier drafts of this article, and to
Gordon Christenson for encouraging and supporting this work.
1. Llewellyn believed that lawyers maintain the cohesiveness of society, and that every
group has someone within it - usually not a lawyer - who performs the task of holding the
group together by overcoming conflicts among its members. See Llewellyn, Law and the Social
Sciences - Especially Sociology, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1291-92 (1949) [hereinafter Llewellyn,
Law ad the Social Sciences]; Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal and the Law-Jobs: The
Problem of Juristic Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1355, 1374, 1398 (1940) [hereinafter Llewellyn,
Law-Jobs]. He viewed 'laymen" as performing essentially the same function as lawyers with
the same skills:
[Ilt is fascinating, as one watches a new family struggle with children who are
just coming to talking age, to watch legally untrained parents - and two- or
three-year-olds - revert to or reinvent such lawyer's techniques as the distinction,
the extension of a rule by analogy, literalistic construction of an announced rule,
or construction according to the spirit which giveth life; or to see them redevelop
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dispute are "negotiating." Universal communication and thinking skills
underlie these lawyer behaviors.2
While this labeling may make lawyering more salable to the public,
it undoubtedly has an unfortunate effect upon the thinking of legal
educators. In the belief that these labels mirror unitary, discrete,
lawyering activities, each reflective of a cultivated or specialized behavior unknown to the common person, lies a conclusion that the

activities themselves must be taught to law students. This manner of
thinking bifurcates the work of lawyers into behavioral and cognitive
units with discernible limits 3 and suggests to law students that lawyers'

almost ab initio the theory of notice and a hearing, or the theory against ex post
facto law.
Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences, supra, at 1304; cf. W. TWINING & D. MIERS, How
TO DO THINGS WITH RULES xiii (1976) (asserting that basic skill of rule-handling is not particularly legal).
2. The AALS Committee on Curriculum headed by Llewellyn called attention to the skills
lawyers share with other liberally educated professionals, and urged law schools to develop
'that use of art in language which is a major phase of the humanities . . . ." Bunn, Cavers,
Falknor, Feezer, Moreau & Llewellyn, The Place of Skills in Legal Education, 45 COLUM. L.
REV. 345, 391 (1945). The committee further noted that "[s]o far as concerns the 'human-nature'
phases of counseling advocacy or other skills of practice, they rest either in that wisdom which
is the goal of all university work or else in a field called psychology .... " Id.
3. A dichotomization of lawyering pervades the literature on legal education. The activity
portion of a professional task - "how to do legal research, to collect and sort facts, to interview,
counsel, and negotiate, and to organize and manage legal work" - is described as "practical"
skills, Wangerin, Skills Training in "Legal Analysis:" A Systematic Approach, 40 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 409, 412 (1986), and as 'technical" skills, Strong, A New Curriculumfor the College
ofLaw of the Ohio State University, 11 OHIO ST. L.J. 44, 47 (1950). The AALS-ABA Committee
on Guidelines for Clinical Legal Education indicated that clinical legal studies may include
activities such as interviewing, fact gathering and file investigating, diagnosing a client's problem,
developing case strategy, counseling, drafting legal instruments and writing legal briefs, negotiating and settling, preparing for and conducting trials, and preparing appellate briefs and arguing

appeals. AALS-ABA

COMMITTEE ON GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, CLIN-

ICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 14-15 (1980).

Juxtaposed to the activity portion of a professional task are those analytical skills thought
to compose the single umbrella skill of "legal analysis." Professor Wangerin summarizes the
content and allocation of the dichotomy: "Skills can be divided into two categories. 'Dialectical'
skills . . . include learning how to read and analyze cases, statutes and regulations, and how
to construct legal arguments. The other skills are Tractical.' ... As a general rule, clinical or
simulation courses teach practical skills." Wangerin, supra, at 411-12. The bifurcation is unsound
for reasons developed in this article and introduced by T. Amsterdam:
By no means all of us so-called clinical teachers ... [of] counseling and negotiation
and trial advocacy thought of ourselves as doing something properly described as
skills training. We thought that what we were doing was no more or less skills
training than what traditional classroom teachers or contracts and torts and crim-
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"skills" are largely behavioral. Curricular offerings to teach these specialized skills focus upon the execution of discrete, divisible operations. 4
Two course genres have evolved. In the first, the student performs
a series of fact-specific, technical behaviors. In the second, the course
design seeks to strengthen a student's interpersonal skills as a foundation to the successful performance of lawyer behaviors. The tendency
to define professional legal skills coterminous with the multitudinous
technical behaviors or with the interpersonal skills integral to these
behaviors flows from the untested premise that the activity dimension
of a professional task defines the contours of professional legal skills.
This article challenges this premise.
Neither the discrete activities of lawyers nor interpersonal communication satisfactorily identifies the distinction between "asking
questions" and "cross-examining" or "legal interviewing." This article
contends that the professional roles of the lawyer in society distinguish
a lawyer's activities from those of other professionals, and a lawyer's
professional skills from ordinary human skills. Educators strive to
teach students to "think like a lawyer." Educators should also strive
to teach students to ask questions "like a lawyer," settle disputes "like
a lawyer," and interview clients "like a lawyer." To define the phrase
"like a lawyer" exposes essential lawyering characteristics and illuminates the distinctiveness of legal skills.
Twenty-five years ago Irvin Rutter rejected the identification of
lawyering skills with lawyers' behaviors, asserting that a limited
number of skills underlie the myriad activities of lawyers. These skills,
according to Professor Rutter, are not severable from the context in

inal law had done when they taught students to read and interpret cases and to
analyze legal doctrines . . . . In exactly the same sense we were doing skills
training when we taught ends-means thinking, information-acquisition analyses,
contingency planning, comparative risk evaluation in decisionmaking, and the like.
These subjects seemed to us no less conceptual or academically rigorous than case
reading and doctrinal analysis.
Amsterdam, ClinicalLegal Education - A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612,
615 (1984).
4. C. Menkel-Meadow has described two categories of modern skills education, "traditional
process or skills courses, such as interviewing, negotiation, counseling and trial advocacy," and
"substantive courses with clinical or fieldwork components, where the primary purpose is the
study of the law and its doctrine in the context of the relevant legal institutions." MenkelMeadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories About Lawyering, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
555, 572 (1980). This article focuses on the more prevalent former category of courses and its
theoretical base.
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which lawyers operate. 5 The practical model of jurisprudence6 offered

here proceeds from Professor Rutter's conclusions by positing the
primacy of lawyering to derive a taxonomy of legal skills. In section
II, the Langdellian educational framework is rejected and its effect
on modern skills education exposed. In section III, the four professional roles of a lawyer and the four units of information upon which
the lawyer draws to execute those roles are described. In section IV,
drawing upon the model developed in section III, "like a lawyer" is
defined, and legal skills are distinguished from "precedent skills" such
as interpersonal communication. Section V concludes the article by

arguing that legal skills education must intellectually equip students
to perform lawyers' roles and must provide opportunities for students
to practice lawyers' roles so that students can acquire replicable legal

skills.
II.

REJECTING ELEMENTALISM

Modern professional skills curricula rest on two dominant theoretical models, both traceable to a legal pedagogy rooted in the Langdellian conception of legal education. 7 That pedagogy has compelled a
5. Rutter perceived a fundamental distinction between lawyers' "operations" and skills.
Rutter, A Jurisprudenceof Lawyers' Operations, 13 J. LEGAL EDUC. 301, 312 (1961). Professor
Rutter called for his colleagues to identify legal skills. Id. Rutter illustrated his analysis in his
discussion of doctrine: "[It] constitutes an intensely practical skill, perhaps the most important
single skill of the practicing lawyer .... [D]octrine is only one part of 'the law,' often a
comparatively small part." Id. at 307. Rutter went on to assert, "Even more importantly, the
part that it does play cannot be adequately perceived when it is learned outside the context of
lawyers' operations. .. ." Id. He then gave this example: "Only one who has suffered through
the preparation of an estate tax return can adequately realize the contribution of this process
to a grasp of the total fabric and interrelationships of the estate tax law." Id. at 326.
Llewellyn sounded thematically similar notes, stressing that one must study and understand
the institution. Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences, supra note 1, at 1289-90. He, like
Rutter, regarded the rule part of the "law-institution" as only one "tool-part" of the institution
and viewed rules not as the substance of the discipline of law, "but instead as being some of
the measures by which the men of the discipline go about the jobs of the institution." Id. at 1291.
6. The model presented here is designed to give discussants a common language and a
common set of concepts on which to build analyses. This model hopefully will provide an effective
medium for describing and discussing lawyers' skills. As Dean Mudd has noted, "[A] formula
or heuristic device is useful precisely because it offers a conceptual framework within which
complex ideas can be considered conveniently." Mudd, Beyond Rationalism: Performawnce-Ref.
erenced Legal Education,36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 189, 203 (1986). While the model of jurisprudence
differs significantly from Dean Mudd's model, both models strive to focus educational questions
in the context of lawyering. Id.
7. Langdell enunciated the function and method of legal education in the preface to his first
casebook:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have
such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and
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disfiguring fragmentation of lawyering in the law curriculum, with
skills curricula having developed as an appendage to the traditional,
doctrinal curriculum. As skills curricula and skills faculty emerged
within and adapted to the Langdellian environment, both acquired
three deleterious characteristics that impede the development and
legitimization of professional skills within the legal academy. These
developmental impediments suggest the need for a re-evaluation of
what constitutes a legal skill.
Legal education generally divides into three discrete concentrations: substantive law, professional ethics, s and professional skills.9

certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs is what constitutes a true
lawyer; and hence to achieve that mastery should be the business of every earnest
student of law . . . . [A]nd much the shortest and best, if not the only way of
mastering the doctrine effectually is by studying the cases in which it is embodied.
C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (1871). Langdell
considered his approach to legal education to be the only alternative to the "trade school"
mentality: "If it [law] be not a science, it is a species of handicraft, and may best be learned
by serving an apprenticeship to one who practices." R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s, at 52 (1983) (quoting Langdell).
Although Langdell's name is that most closely associated with the case method, it was one
of his colleagues - himself a former student of Langdell - James Barr Ames,
who really fixed the type of case book in American law schools. His decisions
were chosen, not with a purpose of tracing by slow steps the historical development
of legal ideas, but with the design, through the selection of striking facts and
vivid opinions, of stimulating the thought of the student, and leading his mind on
by one step after another until he had become familiar with the fundamental
principles of the subject and the reasons for them ....
His method became, at
least for his pupils, the typical method of teaching by cases: Keener followed it,
and later Wambaugh, Williston, Beale, and their younger colleagues[.] It may
well be said that it was the very wide use of Ames' nine case books that established
the case system in other law schools.
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL ASS'N, THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL, 1817-1917, at 81-82 (1918).
8. Professional ethics does not occupy a quantitatively large portion of a law school curriculum. In most schools, the professional responsibility or ethics course is a two or three credit,
one-time course offering. It is elevated here to the level of a "concentration" in light of three
factors: the independent emphasis placed on professional ethics by the profession itself (embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility); the increasingly frequent requirement that applicants
to the bar successfully take a Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam; and the internal
urging that professional responsibility receive more pervasive and serious treatment within the
law curriculum. See, e.g., McKay, What Law Schools Can and Should Do (And Sometimes Do),
30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 491, 514 (1985).
9. A fourth area of concentration, jurisprudence, has emerged over the last fifty years,
according to one observer of legal education. Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education, 71 IOWA
L. REV. 1063, 1068-69 (1986). From the mid-sx-ies until the early eighties, first-year law
students at the University of Cincinnati studied jurisprudence as part of the required Legal
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Course titles quickly signal the concentration of the course; through
the first year curriculum 0 and subsequent accumulation of courses,
students are thought to acquire the fundamentals to enter the legal
profession. Both the overall curriculum design and the typical course
design reflect the "elementalism" of legal education., The elemental

Method course. UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI BULLETIN: COLLEGE OF LAW, 1966-1967, at
19; UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI BULLETIN: COLLEGE OF LAW, 1981-82, at 33. Jurisprudence
is currently an element of a required first-year course at the University of San Diego School
of Law. UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO SCHOOL OF LAW BULLETIN, 1985-87, at 26.
10. First year course load is rarely negotiable. It presents a mix of "essentials" - generally,
substantive law presented through the case method, and legal research and writing. Gee and
Jackson's analysis of 1974-75 catalogs of ABA-approved schools revealed "the almost consensual
first-year curriculum": Contracts, Torts, Property, Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Constitutional
Law, and Legal Research and Writing. E. GEE & D. JACKSON, FOLLOWING THE LEADER?
THE UNEXAMINED CONSENSUS IN LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA 15 (1975). Their research confirmed Professor Rutter's contention, made seven years earlier, that "almost uniformly the
backbone of the first year required curriculum is built upon some version of Beale's 1902 package
which includes Contracts, Torts, Property and Procedure." Rutter, Designing and Teaching the
First-DegreeLaw Curriculum, 37 CIN. L. REV. 9, 49 (1968) (footnote omitted).
Innovations at a number of schools are making inroads into this curricular sanctuary. New
York University School of Law, beginning in the fall of 1986, includes a six-credit lawyering
program in its first-year curriculum. The focus of study is the students' own planning and
performance of a number of activities basic to legal practice: interviewing, counseling, case
analysis and problem handling, negotiation, informal advocacy, and trial advocacy. The program
emphasizes "interpersonal dynamics and communication. The integration of legal and factual
analysis, lawyers' roles and the impact of role on lawyers' thinking, methodologies for lawyers'
planning and decision-making, and techniques for learning how to learn from experience." THE
FIRST YEAR LAWYERING PROGRAM 3 (n.d.). The University of New Mexico School of Law
requires first-year students to take a three-hour Introduction to Law course, which focuses on
justifications for our legal system, and a course in Legislative and Administrative Processes,
which analyzes processes by which policy is translated into law and then applied, and teaches
principles and techniques of statutory construction and interpretation. THE UNIVERSITY OF
NEw MEXICO BULLETIN: SCHOOL OF LAW 26-27 (n.d.). The University of San Diego School
of Law requires first-year students to take a three-hour Law and Lawyering course involving
"jurisprudence, the history and nature of the legal profession, the roles of attorneys in society
and the legal system, and the nature of the attorney-client relationship." UNIVERSITY OF SAN
DIEGO SCHOOL OF LAW BULLETIN 1985-87, at 26. Beginning in the fall of 1987 Vermont Law
School will inaugurate a three-year mandatory general practice course. Nat'l L.J., Aug. 25,
1986, at 4, col. 3.
11. A more historical and jurisprudential analysis of legal education might account for the
elemental nature of modern legal education in the tension between Langdellian legal philosophy
and that of the Realists. The former postulates and emphasizes the primary nature of doctrinal
law and the latter at least sensitizes some educators to the more practical dimensions of lawyering. As Twining has recently described the arguable points of tension:
First, insofar as members of the movement [realism] perceived a shared enemy
or set of targets in a newly dominant orthodoxy [Langdellism], there were several
different kinds of reasons for their dissatisfaction: the illusion of the logical form
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educator divides the material to be taught into individual units that
are taught sequentially. This sequential approach assumes that the
student who understands the individual units will be able to identify
and integrate those units necessary to the performance of a lawyering
activity. Elementalism presumes that a lawyer's activity, such as drafting a contract, is a sum of generalizable, severable parts, such as the
writing form, the responsibilities of the lawyer, and the controlling
law of the jurisdiction.12
To illustrate, fourth amendment search and seizure law is taught
through analysis of leading Supreme Court cases. Neither the materials nor faculty routinely address the drafting, argumentation, or role
of a Motion to Suppress, except insofar as the motion provides a
vehicle for appellate review. Allocated to the skills faculty would be,
perhaps, a lesson in interviewing the defendant to obtain facts giving
rise to the fourth amendment issue or an exercise in cross-examining
the police officer on his compliance with the fourth amendment. Under
the tutelage of the Professional Responsibility professor, the student
may consider the ethical dilemma raised when he doubts his client's
account of the arrest and the police officer's conduct.
Legal educators' reliance on elementalism 13 extends beyond the

or of so-called mechanical jurisprudence; the divorce between legal education and
private legal practice; the rather different divorce between law in books and law
in action; the intellectual - and, separably, the political - conservatism of
Langdellism; the nonempirical nature of Langdell's "science"; and the unresponsiveness of this kind of legal discourse to the needs of the American legal system.
Twining, Talk About Realism, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 329, 354-55 (1985). Such jurisprudential
tensions have surfaced in clinical education and skills training. See Wizner & Curtis, "Here's
What We Do": Some Notes About Clinical Legal Eduation, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 673 (1980).
But as Professor Stevens has observed, educational theory may be no more than 'mere historical
survivals." Stevens, Legal Education: The Challenge of the Past, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 475,
483 (1985). To the extent that any coherent theory of legal education exists, educators endorse
the dichotomy of the academic and practical sides of legal curriculum. See sources cited supra
note 3.
12. Even using an elemental analysis, this brief list of the "parts" of drafting a contract is
inaccurate. The beginning lawyer should also incorporate the "custom" governing the particular
type of contract. Soia Mentschikoff illustrates: "Even today, all contracts have some kind of
status left over. Look at the typical lease. It has boiler plate provisions recognizing the landlord's
higher status, and very few tenants are able to change the lease provisions. Lawyers must
understand this or clients will be harmed." Mentschikoff & Stotzky, Law - The Last of the
Universal Disciplines, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 695, 724 n.56 (1986). Additionally, the young lawyer
must determine the controlling facts detailing the intent and goals of the parties to the contract.
"Fact" education has appeared more recently through discrete course offerings. See D. BINDER
& P. BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION FROM HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF (1984).
13. Notable exceptions to and criticism of the elementalism of legal education exist. Chief
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academic. One argument proffered repeatedly in opposition to skills
education urges deferring skills training to the students' first employ-14
ers, since skills are a more easily learned component of lawyering.
Thus, the educational burden of the law school is eased in a benign

manner, while faculty time is freed for scholarly research and writing
and management. of the law school. 15
While an elemental orientation so pervades legal education that
alternatives seem impractical and unfeasible, 16 reconsideration of the

among them has been the work of Irvin Rutter who recognized the integrated nature of lawyers'
work. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
In addition to literature deviating from the elemental approach notable exceptions exist in
courses. See infra note 16.
14. In a plenary session of the 1984 annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools, Dean Sandalow asserted,
The more difficult question is whether... law schools are obligated to foster
development of purely professional skills and knowledge ....
The time, energy, and attention of students and the financial resources of law
schools are limited. A decision is required about the purposes to which they can
most profitably be devoted. [In my view,] [n]one is sufficient to justify allocating
it to purely professional training. Doing so unduly sacrifices the ability of the
schools to cultivate the more general intellectual qualities that students require
Moreover, purely professional training can as readily be offered outside law
schools, but many of the intellectual qualities discussed earlier are likely to take
root and be cultivated only within a university. The nourishment of these qualities
is the special mission of the university and, therefore, of law schools within the
university.
Sandalow, The Moral Responsibility of Law Schools, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 163, 174-75 (1984).
15. Shaffer and Redmount proffer a psychological explanation: law faculty oppose emphasis
on personal or interpersonal awareness or on human relations skills because of its irrelevance
to their own success. Faculty have been rewarded for their intellectual skills, and their professional lives transpire "in chambers that are insular, and even remote from daily life." T. SHAFFER
& R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 135 (1977). Along similar lines,
Zemans and Rosenblum suggest that emphasizing "analytical" skills at the expense of 'nterpersonal" skills serves to focus attention on 'the ideal-type tasks of the profession which set it
apart from and contribute to its prestige in the larger society." F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM,
THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION 123-32 (1981).
16. The enormity of the task of reorganizing a faculty curriculum and teaching materials
to comport with a different education theory is reflected in the experience at City University
of New York. See Kaplan, PioneeringSpirit Thrives at a Unique Law School, Nat'l L.J., Oct.
1, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Linn, This Is a Law School?, STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1984, at 37. Dean
Charles Halpern noted,
A sense of dissatisfaction with current legal education and with the performance
of the legal profession is widespread among practitioners and teachers and in the
larger society . . . . Most law schools are not in a position to respond to the
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elementalism of legal education is warranted. The assumption that
any single lawyering activity is the conjoining of severable, generalizable parts suffers notable flaws. 17 The conjoining process requires feats
of identification and recall beyond the abilities of even exceptionally
capable beginning lawyers. Consider, for example, a beginning lawyer's
first attempt to draft a contract. The lawyer must elicit facts and
goals from the client, identify controlling doctrine, and then draft.
Perhaps, if recall is sufficient, the lawyer can draw upon Interviewing
and Counseling, Contract, and Legal Drafting courses, respectively.
But in which course did the lawyer learn how to identify each "element"
of the task? Additionally, where has the lawyer learned how to integrate these elements, such as the client's desire to restrict competition,
a doctrinal disapproval of anticompetition clauses, and a personal dis-

taste for broad anticompetition clauses? And perhaps most importantly, how will the beginning lawyer evaluate the final product and
identify areas for improvement?1s

criticism even when they share many of its judgments; their curricula were established years ago, and change comes slowly.
Halpern, From the Dean, CUNY Law School at Queens College, 1985-1986, at 3, 5.
On a smaller scale, individual professors integrate traditional substantive material, skills
literature and simulation to produce another alternative to the Langdellian fragmentation of
lawyering. See, e.g., L. LoPucKi, PLAYER'S MANUAL FOR THE DEBTOR CREDITOR GAME
(1984).
17. Additionally, legal education as currently structured fails to stimulate adult students.
See, e.g., Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 584
(1983). In reviewing "the larger defects" of the legal system and the role of law schools in
addressing them, President Bok pointed out that
[l]av students have also complained for years about the sameness of instruction
with its constant discussion of borderline cases and problems. In contrast to medical
school, where the experience becomes more absorbing as students leave the lecture
hall and enter the ward and clinic, legal education often seems tedious after the
first year.
Id.
Educational theory suggests that adults learn in a manner quite distinct from that of children.
A linear approach, like the elemental approach, does not correspond to the problem-solving
focus and experiential orientation of the adult learner. See Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of
Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 321, 328-30 (1982); cf. Clark, The Rationale for
Computer-Aided Instruction, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 459, 463 (1983) (branching allows instructional
feedback to vary with students' responses); Hazen & Hazen, Simulation of Legal Analysis and
Instruction on the Computer, 59 IND. L.J. 195, 198 (1984) (computerized instruction eliminates
need for students to progress linearly: branching forward or backward within materials permits
learning from errors at more individual pace and format).
18. These are not the only questions that might occur to the beginning lawyer first confronted with lawyering tasks. The beginning lawyer may also be concerned at an emotional
reaction toward the client, or the family's reaction to the hours devoted to work. The law
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Practicing lawyers challenge the soundness of elementalism in their
report that legal education failed to prepare them for lawyering.19 This
complaint belies the assumption that the law school graduate will

intuitively employ, from legal education, the elements of knowledge
necessary to perform competently. The complaint suggests that a
lawyering activity is a process that, in its execution, is greater than
the sum of learnable, discrete parts.20
The inadequacies of legal education in preparing students for
lawyering activity are not ameliorated by current skills courses that
focus primarily on technical lawyering behaviors, 21 or on the interpersonal skills relevant to those behaviors.2 Both schools of skills education advance theories of legal skills elemental in nature. The theoretical
constriction is not surprising given the rigidly elemental curricular
environment in which skills courses evolved. Whatever may be the

curriculum neglects questions addressing the relationship between a lawyer's personal self and
professional self, much to the detriment, perhaps, of the profession. See Meltsner, Whither
Legal Education, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 579, 583 (1985).
19. F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, supranote 15, at 137. Zemans and Rosenblum note that
[t]he skills rated [by surveyed attorneys] as the most important to the practice
of law were apparently learned outside law school. Only for the capacity to marshal
and order facts to apply concepts do the law schools receive substantial credit
(44%). The other three skills most important to the practice of law - fact gathering, instilling confidence, and effective oral expression - were learned in law
school by only very small proportions of the bar.
Id. The surveyed lawyers did not attribute this failure to the limits inherent in formal education.
As Zemans and Rosenblum report: "Fact-gathering, effective oral expression, drafting legal
documents, opinion writing, and accounting skills are all generally considered to be within the
capacity of law schools to teach, but they are viewed by only very small proportions of the
respondents as having actually been learned there." Id. at 139.
20. The failure of legal education to educate students for lawyering competence received
extended description and prescription in Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on
Lawyer Competency: The Role of the Law Schools, 1979 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADInsSIONS TO THE BAR [hereinafter Cramton Report]. In identifying the skills fundamental to
lawyering, the report noted seven areas, each one described by a verb, suggesting that competence in process, not just information, underlies effective lawyering. Id. at 9-10.
21. See supra note 3.
22. See Aiken, Koplow, Lerman, Ogilvy, & Schrag, The Learning Contract in Legal Education, 44 MD. L. REV. 1047 (1985) (describes the purest form of the interpersonal skills
approach) [hereinafter Schrag]. Most materials are hybrids, in the sense that attention to interpersonal skills appears within the context of specific fact situations.
A putative third theory of professional skills training identifies and teaches skills within the
roles that lawyers perform, the roles defined as fact-finder, interviewer, and counselor. MenkelMeadow, supra note 4, at 559. The materials Professor Menkel-Meadow identifies with this
school of thought uniformly emphasize interpersonal skills, marking this theory as a variant of
the interpersonal school of professional skills.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss1/3

10

Murphy and Weissenberger:
A Practical
Model of Jurisprudence: Extending Realist Theory
PRACTICAL MODEL
OF JURISPRUDENCE

wisdom of the Langdellian fragmentation of lawyering, the patterning
influence on skills education has been powerful: skills educators have
fallen into lock-step with traditional faculty, creating courses that teach
but another set of elements.
In behavior-oriented skills courses, such as Interviewing and Counseling or Civil Clinic, the student practices a fact specific task, confining the learning experience to the particular facts of the exercise or
clinic. Typically, this experience offers the student little upon which
to extrapolate in the future.2 Behavior-oriented professional skills
courses manifest the theory that legal skills coincide with and are
defined by the physical activities engaged in by lawyers. In live client
clinic, for example, students take an assigned case from initial interview through resolution.- The "skill" portion of that exercise is coextensive with the physical activity of the lawyer. Examples of this are
interviewing the client for the facts, drafting and filing the papers,
and conducting the discovery. The student serves as the lawyer with,
perhaps, adjunctive simulation training to prepare for anticipated interviews or court appearances.
Although case handling exposes students to broad lawyering processes and the demands of performance, practical constraints have
prevented such courses from becoming a vehicle for broad skills education. In addition to the pressures from funding sources,2 caseload
and client responsibility have contributed to the inability of willing
clinicians 26 to expand the breadth of skills education within the clinical

23. Certain commercially available materials attempt to offer students structural and
generalized information that both informs the immediate performance of a professional task and
offers guidance to future performances of the task. See, e.g., R. MARTINEAU, FUNDAMENTALS
OF MODERN APPELLATE ADVOCACY (1985). Such materials alone do not, however, offer the
student the role experience that is basic to any skill. See infa § V.

24.

Case-oriented courses are usually taught as live-client clinics, with students acting as

counsel on actual legal problems. The students ordinarily work under the supervision of an

attorney, either the clinical instructor or an adjunct lawyer, as ordinarily required by state
student practice rules. See, e.g., Ohio Governing R. II 1-2, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 19
(Anderson 1873 & Supp. 1986) (limited practice of law by legal interns). Innovations on this
type of clinic include a fully simulated clinic at William Mitchell School of Law and case respon-

sibilities assumed in conjunction with a substantive seminar. Even in its variations, however,
the skills focus is upon the activities necessary to manage a particular type of case.
25. See infra note 44.
26. Some clinicians, focusing on the particular substantive specialty of the clinic, in fact

reject any attempt to teach skills broadly. A review of the history of clinical legal education
suggests that at its incipience, the format was a politically influenced attempt to heighten
student awareness within the context of professional responsibility. See Stevens, supranote 11,

at 483. The transformation into a major educational basis for professional skills education has
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course.2 Activity-focused courses immerse the student in narrowly
circumscribed behaviors - perhaps those with which the skills faculty
are most familiar - representing a small and potentially deceptive
fragment of the broad world of lawyering.
A second type of skills course focuses less upon the physical activity
to stress the underlying interpersonal skills2 used in those activities.
Such courses indoctrinate students in those social skills that affect the
quality of their lawyering. As aptly described by Professor Bergman,
"Many of the social skills involved in legal work, such as showing
empathy during interviewing and counseling, or questioning in trial
representation, are skills which non-lawyers and lawyers alike use in
everyday life." The emphasis on interpersonal skills presumes that
such skills are an "element" of every lawyering behavior, and that,
by improving such skills, the student will better perform every future
lawyering task.30
For the student, neither prevailing legal skills theory educationally
identifies rudimentary and unique skills necessary for the myriad tasks
that lawyers regularly perform. 3 ' Both theories delimit a concept of
legal skills that exist independently of other elements of the legal

occurred gradually and subtlely. See infra note 34. The willingness of clinical faculty to assume
at least titular responsibility for broad professional skills education may have accompanied a
general desire for professional recognition and security within the law school academy. Cf. infra
note 43 (the professional status of clinicians remains in flux).
Some clinics retain as a primary objective the exposure of students to an indigent, deprived,
or culturally distinct clientele, both to nourish students' political awareness and provide much
needed pro bono services.
27. See, e.g., Stuckey, The Vocational Model in Practice: The Domestic Practice Clinic,
in AALS NATIONAL CLINICAL TEACHERS CONFERENCE MATERIALS 66, 70 (1986). Stuckey's
objective was to "design a clinic in which the students would perform a broad range of lawyering
tasks, primarily to help them acquire a better understanding of law practice. Acquisition or
improvement of particular skills was to be a secondary objective." Id.
28. Professional skills education takes the form of live-client clinic and simulation courses.
For purposes of describing the theoretical bases for legal skills a methodological demarcation
is not helpful. Courses emphasizing interpersonal skills, for example, include live-client clinic,
see Schrag, supra note 22, at 1054-55, and simulation courses in discrete, lawyer activities such
as interviewing. See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO SCHOOL OF LAW 1985-87 BULLETIN
25-26.
29. Bergman, Sherr & Burridge, Games Law Teachers Play, in AALS CLINICAL LAW
TEACHERS CONFERENCE MATERIALS 163, 171 (1986).
30. Schrag, supra note 22, at 1054-56.
31. In this regard professional legal skills education contrasts dramatically with the repetitive traditional education in case analysis or "thinking like a lawyer." Most commentators agree
that law schools succeed in schooling lawyers in this particular legal skill, however subject to
definitional debate that skill might be. See F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note 15, at 137.
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curriculum. Rarely does the skills course material, for example,
explore the relationship between the "skill" and case law or the statutory background of the case.1 Although behavior-oriented education
exposes a student to the professional roles of a lawyer, it does not
systematically identify, for example, how variations in professional
roles affect skill performance. To the extent that a student "learns"
a "skill," the experience is fact-bound. As Professor Rutter has argued,
no law school could hope to offer such task-specific preparation for
the manifold activities of lawyers.3

The theoretical narrowness of professional skills education, at best,
aggravates the political and practical realities of skills educators.4
First, whether primarily through behavior-oriented simulation
courses, such as interviewing and counseling, through live-client clinic,
or through interpersonal skills training, professional skills education
occurs in isolation from the law school curriculum. Specialized courses,
materials, and faculty have increasingly appeared in the last decade,
solidifying skills training as an independent and frequently autonomous
component of the curriculum. Second, skills education is pervasively
perceived as marginal, that is, of dubious acceptability within the legal
academy, particularly in comparison to traditional core course offerings.36 Third, student perception of skills education focuses on the

32. See infra note 40.
33. Rutter, supra note 5, at 312. According to Rutter, offering task-specific courses such
as drafting, counseling, examination, and cross-examination 'qnvolves a choice between selection
of an insignificant number in the endless variety and multiplicity of professional operations and
the impossible job of covering a large enough number to make even a dent in the vast area of
practice." Id.
34. The extent to which "skills" faculty and "clinical" faculty overlap is undocumented.
Recent trends, however, warrant the assumption that clinical educators and skill educators are
not professionally distinct. See, e.g. Stuckey, ABA Skills TrainingCommittee, AALS - Clinical
Legal Educ. Newsletter (n.d.) (describing substitution of "professional skills instruction" for
"clinical legal education" in proposed ABA-AALS survey by Skills Training Committee of the
ABA, Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar Section).
35. Notable exceptions exist. The University of Denver College of Law conducts an integrated Advocacy Skills Program consisting of traditional law courses, a practicum program, an
internshiplexternship program, and a student law office. UNIVERSITY OF DENVER BULLETIN:
COLLEGE OF LAW, August 15, 1985, at 24. The University of San Francisco School of Law
requires first-year students to complete a two-semester Lawyering Process course aimed at
integrating skills and substance by focusing on the legal process in the context of substantive
first-year classes. University of San Francisco School of Law: Lawyering Process 1984-85, at 1
(unpublished manuscript); see also supranotes 10 & 16 (discussion of various law school curricula).
36. One commentator has described this marginality using terms such as "soft" and
"feminine" in locating the clinic offerings in relation to the 'ard" and "masculine" traditional
offerings. Tushnet, Scenes from the Metropolitan Underground:A Critical Perspective on the
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"reality" of skills courses, as opposed to the "irrelevancy" of traditional

courses. 7 Although such practical and political troubles are not of
themselves sufficient grounds for rejecting the elemental foundation
of skills education, they do reflect a need to identify and define the
relationship, if any, between legal skills theory and the traditional

curriculum.
Each of these three characteristics imposes restrictions and burdens upon the development of professional skills education and
educators. Curricular isolation, and the development of skills specialization, have led to doctrinal and professional isolation. The results
are anomalous: skills faculty cluster together and skills materials
largely omit discussion of substantive issues. The doctrinal confluence
between the criminal clinical supervisor and the criminal procedure
professor is frequently unexplored in favor of the perceived similarity
between clinical methodology and, for example, the teaching methodology of the interviewing and counseling professor. Additionally, skills
instructional materials fail to address the effect of underlying substantive doctrine on the execution of a particular skiIl,3 assuming, for

Status of Clinical Education, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 272, 274-75 (1984). "Clinical education
concerns people, unstructured situations, and feelings, all of which in our culture are generally
associated with being female." Id. at 274.
37. See J. Boland, Ethnographic Study of Guardian Ad Litem Clinic 4-6, 16-18 (Nov. 12,
1985) (unpublished manuscript and data files).
38. The doctrinal narrowness of materials has been costly for skills faculty who must too
frequently create their own materials or tailor commercially available materials to their own
needs. Soia Mentschikoff and Irwin Stotzky have noted the toll this myopia takes on students:
Clinical exercises are often performed by students who do not possess the necessary substantive knowledge about the area in which the problem arises. For
example, certain trial skills, such as cross-examination, are often taught in the
context of a problem with which a student is entirely unfamiliar. This leads to a
false assumption by students that knowledge of "how to do it" - how to perform
a cross-examination of a witness, for example, - is sufficient witlout knowledge
of the field of law at issue.
Mentschikoff & Stotzky, supra note 12, at 698-99 n.6.
Binder and Price note the lawyer's knowledge of the substantive law as an element in legal
interviewing. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 54, 86-87
(1979). Redmount and Shaffer identify "decid[ing] when and how to utilize law in client affairs"
as part of legal counseling. R. REDMOUNT & T. SHAFFER, TEACHER'S GUIDE: LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 3, 19 (1980) [hereinafter TEACHER'S GUIDE]. The student materials
call attention to the importance of substantive law only twice. R. REDMOUNT & T. SHAFFER,
LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 2-30, 7-5 (1980) [hereinafter LEGAL INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING]. That these course materials give only passing notice to the role of underlying
substantive doctrine implies that counseling and interviewing skills can be effectively taught
and learned without attention to the role of substantive law in the process. G. WILLIAMS,
LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (1983) does not expressly examine the effect of sub-
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example, that the skills instructor and the sidlls course will have a
general litigation orientation 9
Current characterization of skills education has resulted in marginality both for the skills faculty and for the skills curriculum. 4 In a
world of limited resources, skills faculty, courses, and budgets are
frequently the first objects of consideration, and the last objects for
implementation, when a school faces economic limitations. 41 Indeed,
the very existence of skills faculty and programs is largely attributable
to the availability of grant money and other soft funding.A As that

stantive law on the negotiation and settlement process.
39. Redmount and Shaffer's materials include exercises that require the skills instructor
(and the students) to apply criminal law, family law, and the law pertaining to wills and estates,
landlord-tenant relations, and corporations. LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING, supra
note 38. The Binder and Price instructor's manual contains exercises that require application
of the law to a wide variety of factual situations, including petty theft, failure to pay child
support, repossession of a chattel, influence of alcohol and possession of marijuana, personal
injury, and discriminatory enforcement of a municipal ordinance. D. BINDER & S. PRICE,
INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL FOR LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 33-36, 38-39, 50-52,
63-70, 83-86, 92-93 (1979).
40. In several places skills education has moved into the center of the curriculum. The
most notable example is CUNY Law School at Queens College. See CUNY LAv SCHOOL AT
QUEENS COLLEGE 1985-1986 (1985); see also supra notes 10, 16 & 35 (discussion of various
law school curricula).
41. See Kelso & Kelso, Legal Education's Future: A Broader Horizon or a Narrowing
Window?, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 661, 666 (1981). After noting the diminishing flow of federal funds
to the states, the Kelsos suggest that
[i]t thus seems likely for the decade of the '80s that at least some of the law
schools and their universities will face the question of whether the existing number
Expensive clinical programs and seminars
of instructors can be maintained ....
on newly developed fields will be tempting places to begin. They probably will
have less powerful support in faculty councils than will the more traditionally
established courses that relate to the bar examination and that draw heavy student
enrollment.
Id.
42. From a historic point of view, the extensive number of clinical programs which
exist today found their origin through the $10,000,000 allocated to the support of
clinical legal education by the Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR). These funds were largely used to make grants to law schools
throughout the country to initiate and expand clinical programs.
Swords & Walwer, Cost Aspects of Clinical Education, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 133,
189-90 (1980). CLEPR funds were awarded on a declining basis, with the understanding that
the school would find the means to finance the program in succeeding years. Some schools
secured add-on funding from other foundations and government agencies. Id. at 190.
Beginning in 1978, law schools received monies for clinical education under Title IX of the
Higher Education Act. In 1979-80, 56 institutions received Title IX funding. Id.
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money has become increasingly scarce, skills faculty have turned to
their law schools and alternative funding sources to secure their place
in the law school curriculum. These financial maneuvers have resulted
in separate professional tracks for many clinical educators' 3 and re-

strictions in clinical design," both reinforcing the isolation of the skills
curriculum and faculty, and simultaneously inhibiting assimilation of

skills educators by law schools.
Finally, and particularly as a result of student perspective, current
skills education distorts the actual role of "skills" in the practice of
law. Students in skill classes tend to minimize the importance and
reality of the substantive law, emphasizing their human relational
skills to the displacement of their substantive training. 4s As discussed

in the following section, lawyers' professional skills are no more nor
less "real" or essential than the doctrinal component of lawyers' work.
However, the perpetuation of this myth, that skills education has a
greater claim to reality, disserves students seeking education to perform as lawyers.

43. The professional status of "skills" faculty is unclear. To the undetermined extent that
"skills" and "clinical" faculty overlap, see supra note 34, their professional status remains an
issue within many law schools and within the academy itself. See Yarborough, Report from
Skills Training Committee, Syllabus, Sept. 1985, at 1, col. 4. The Skills Training Committee
of the American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar began
in late 1985 to evaluate the effectiveness of clinical legal education programs with the aim of
establishing benchmarks from which progress can be made in accomplishing the goals of Accreditation Standard 405(e). Standard 405(e) encourages law schools to accord clinical law teachers
status substantially equivalent to that enjoyed by other law faculty. Id.
Joel Seligman, in his study of what he calls the "Harvard method" of legal education, observes
that
[a]s late as 1975-1976, clinical supervisors remained second-class citizens on most
law school faculties, with such denigrating titles as 'instructor,' 'lecturer,' 'adjunct
professor,' or 'staff attorney.' Only 15% were hired under contracts that could
lead to tenured positions. Although clinical supervisors often worked longer hours,
they were typically paid less than academic professors.
J. SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL 163-64 (1978).
44. Law School clinics that depend on funding by Legal Services Corporation must limit
their services to the poor as do other Legal Services Corporation grantees. See Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-88, 99 Stat. 293, 305 (1985); 51 Fed. Reg. 28,641
(1986); cf. Legal Services Corporation Regulations, 45 C.F.R. 1611.3 (1985) (eligibility requirements for clients of Legal Services Corporation grantees). Some grants further restrict use of
the funds to certain poor people, for example, the elderly. See Legal Services Corporation
Announcement of Adjustments in the Intended Awards Under the Law School Civil Clinical
Program, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,800 (1985). Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account (IOLTA) grants
similarly require that they be expended for delivery of civil legal services to poor individuals.
See Request for Comments, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,778 (1985).
45. See J. BOLAND, supra note 37, at 4-6.
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The consequences of the current methods of skills training are not
unnoticed by legal academicians:
One of the things that terrifies us as we look at the law school
world and see that skills are often taught without substance
or that information is stressed to the exclusion of an understanding of the process, is that those who are being trained in
that limited way are simply never going to know what they
do not know. They will simply be unable to judge46 adequately
the necessary ingredients of a competent lawyer.
Calls for greater understanding of what skills actually are, and how
best to teach them to law students, pervade the literature on skills
47
teaching and jurisprudence.
A complete re-evaluation of legal skills theory and education must
follow the recognition that the present state of skills education is a
product of the artificial, elemental character of the pre-existing curriculum. Moreover, it is arguable that current skills programs are
suspect to the extent that they assume a theoretical and political
posture of accommodation. This argument is buttressed by the undeniably unfortunate consequences of isolation, marginality, and distor-

46. Mentschikoff & Stotzky, supra note 12, at 743 n.78; see also Committee on Appellate
Skills Training, Appellate Litigation Skills Training: The Role of the Law Schools, A.B.A.
APPELLATE JUDGES CONF. 13-15, 18-19, 28 (1985) (typical appellate advocacy and moot court
programs provide law students almost none of the knowledge or skills necessary to be competent
in handling appellate litigation).
47. See, e.g., F. ZEMAeNS & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note 15, at 123-64; Boyer & Cramton,
American Legal Education: An Agenda for Research and Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221,
231, 270-75 (1974); Llewellyn, The Place of Skills in Legal Education, 45 COLuM. L. REV. 345
(1945); Rutter, supra note 5; Strong, The Pedagogic Training of a Law Faculty, 25 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 226 (1973); Strong, PedagogicalImplications of Inventorying Legal Capacities, 3 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 555 (1951); cf. Cramton Report, supra note 20 (supporting stronger emphasis
on skills development within law schools); Baird, A Survey of the Relevance of Legal Training
to Lawv School Graduates, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 264 (1978) (identifying skills lawyers find important and role of law school in developing them); Gee & Jackson, Current Studies of Legal
Education: Findings and Recommendations, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 471, 480-88, 504 (1982) (concluding that legal education needs to prepare students more effectively for practical tasks of
law practice); Mentschikoff & Stotzky, supra note 12, at 701 n.9 (identifying skills as component
of liberal legal education).
Rutter succinctly stated the task thus:
If we can isolate, extract, and crystallize a limited number of skills underlying
legal operations generally, we may then be in a position to organize some broad
fields of operations into a systematic structure, subject to guiding operational
principles and techniques, using relatively few concrete operations as a vehicle
for training in such underlying skills.
Rutter, supra note 5, at 312.
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tion. The assimilation problems experienced by modern professional
skills courses and faculty suggest that, despite a general endorsement
of the desirability of teaching lawyering skills, 48 broad agreement on
what constitutes a legal professional skill is still lacking. 49 The practical
model of jurisprudence offered in section III as a basis for legal skills
education proceeds not from hole filling in the existing curricular to-

pography but from an analysis of what lawyers actually do in their
work.
III.

A

PRACTICAL MODEL OF JURISPRUDENCE

The practical model of jurisprudence comprises two primary operative levels: the four roles of a lawyer and the four units of information
that a lawyer creates and consults in the execution of the lawyer's
roles. In every task a lawyer performs, the roles that guide, shape,
and restrict the gathering and use of information are relation-coordinator, interpreter, representative, and resolver.m These roles can
easily be observed through a closer look at what is known about the
nature of lawyering.

48. Commentators have not always agreed that professional skills should be taught. Professor Stevens chronicles the hostility toward skills education generally - and clinical approaches
particularly - in his history of American legal education. R. STEVENS, supra note 7, at 216,
238-41. The traditional view of legal education "stresses the role of experience and training
after law school (a period of informal apprenticeship or professional development) in the development of a full-fledged, competent lawyer." Cramton Report, supra note 20, at 11. While the
Cranton Committee Report found that "[flew elements of competence have been totally ignored
by law school instruction," it nonetheless concluded that law schools can do a better job than
they presently do in developing some of the fundamental skills underemphasized by traditional
legal education. Id. at 11, 14; cf. ASSOCIATION OF Am. LAW SCHOOLS, TRAINING FOR THE
PUBLIC PROFESSIONS OF THE LAV: 1971, at 7, 8, 36 (P. Carrington ed. 1971) (proposing place
for skills education in standard law school curriculum) [hereinafter Carrington]; D. Bok, supra
note 17, at 584 (recommending "classes to study the methods of mediation and negotiation,
supervised work in new institutions for delivering legal services ... seminars on new ways of
resolving disputes and avoiding litigation").
49. Problems of isolation, marginality, and student misperception might well persist even
in the face of a theoretically sound definition of professional skills. Nevertheless, defining legal
professional skills in a manner coordinated with the traditional curriculum and rooted in lauvyering
maximizes the possibility of cooperative rather than polarized educational efforts.
50. The roles of a lawyer are both externally imposed through societal-client need and
expectation and internally imposed through the lawyer's desires for social reform, prestige, and
wealth. The primacy of roles derives from the confluence of societal expectation and individual
response, each of which exerts pressure upon the manner in which the role is performed. Sarat
& Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & SoC'v REV. 93, 93
(1986). As Dean Mudd has recently noted in his article arguing for performance-related education,
'The world of the performer and the audience are inseparably intertwined. A proper frame of
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The second level of the model identifies four informational resources
that inform a lawyer in performance of the professional roles and
that are created, examined, consulted, and used through the legal
skills discussed in section IV. In discharging a role, a lawyer negotiates
doctrine, facts, societal values, and personal self. In performance of
a role, the lawyer transforms these informational resources into volitional action or inaction. For example, the operational result may be
as dramatic as initiating a law suit, or as instantaneous as a choice of
words in posing a question during a deposition. The common denominator to all legal activity is the process of performing within a
professional role in a manner informed by societal values, personal
self, doctrine, and situation-specific facts: legal skills provide the mechanisms by which the process is consciously controlled.
Empirical studies of lawyering 1 provide a reference for identifying
and culling the significant characteristics of what lawyers do. As used
here, the term "lawyer" includes those who have been admitted to
the bar 2 and are engaged in legal work. The term "legal work" includes, but is not limited to, work performed on behalf of a traditional
client base.- 3 For reasons that will become evident, 'legal work" is
used broadly to reach the "lawyer as decision maker, and . . . as
counselor." The first tier of the lawyering model, therefore, includes

reference for lawyer performance must account for the internal point of view - that of the
professional, and the external point of view- that of the client." Mudd, supranote 6, at 202-03.
51. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN: A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIONERS
IN CHICAGO (1962); B. CURRAN, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT (1985); W. WEYRAUCH,
THE PERSONALITY OF LAWYERS (1964); F. ZEALANS & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note 15;
Laumann & Heinz, Specialization and Prestigein the Legal Profession:The Structure of Deference, 1977 Ai. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 155; Lortie, Laymen to Lawmen: Law School, Careers,
and Professional Socialization, 29 HARv. EDUC. REV. 352 (1959). Additionally, the authors
draw upon their own personal experiences in skills education and the practice of law.
52. This bottom-line criterion is admittedly arbitrary. The exclusion of certain people who,
based on the discussion that follows, would otherwise be included, is difficult to justify based
on the absence of bar admission alone. However, the exclusion affects only those tasks that are
performed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, the latter being accounted for in the theory espoused
here, but not in the numbers cited.
53. Zemans and Rosenblum limited their study to the practicing bar, including government
attorneys who actually represent the government and attorneys who work for corporations in
the capacity of house counsel or as part of the legal staff. They excluded legal academicians,
judges, government attorneys whose primary job was administrative or legislative, and corporate
managers and officers who happened to be licensed attorneys. F. ZEMIANS & V. ROSENBLUI,
supra note 15, at 18. But see IV. WEYRAUCH, supra note 51, at 26-27 (1964) (study of German
"lawyers" that included legal scholars, judges, prosecutors, attorneys and notaries, administrative officials, and business advisors).
54. Brown & Shaffer, Toward a Jurisprudencefor the Law Office, 17 A31. J. JURIS. 125,
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lawyers as judges, mediators, legislators, and guardians.Y The number

of lawyers currently engaged in legal work exceeds 500,000.r
Functionally, the work of lawyers involves the terms, including
rules and agreements, by which individuals, government, and organizations 57 - hereinafter referred to as "units of interest" - coexist in
a world of limited space, knowledge, and resources.6 Lawyers work

among these units of interest, creating bridges of cooperation and
agreement, formulating and pursuing demands, and representing and

resolving issues in conflict. Some observers describe lawyering, on a
macro level, as a major legitimating force that facilitates the imposition
and maintenance of power balances. 59 Others have asserted that
lawyers function in a self-serving positioning for employment and
status.60 A third view argues that only by the civilized hand of the
lawyers will the units of interest function in a progressive direction.,1

125-26 (1972). The prior exclusion of lawyers' counseling and decisionmaking function has distorted the image of client-based lawyers. As Mentschikoff & Stotzky observed, "Lawyers generally spend more time as counselors than as advocates." Mentschikoff & Stotzky, supra note
12, at 716. Mentschikoff based this observation on a series of research studies conducted under
her supervision between 1955 and 1960. Id. at 714 n.35. Indeed, a study completed in 1983
revealed that attorneys in a typical case "spend almost half of this time in conferences with
clients, factual investigation other than discovery, and settlement negotiation." Trubek, Sarat,
Felstiner, Kritzer, Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 90
(1983) [hereinafter Trubek]; cf. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don'tKnow (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and LitigiousSociety,
31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983) (challenging notion of "litigation explosion").
55. The model of jurisprudence does not include, for example, law professors who have,
for academic purposes, removed themselves from "legal work" as defined below. See infra text
accompanying notes 64-130.
56. See B. CURRAN, supra note 51, at 12 (excluding retired or inactive lawyers and lawyers
in education).
57. "Organizations" refers to formal and informal groupings of individuals, some of which
may seek status as legally recognized entities. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363 (1982).
58. This truncated description of societal organization is intended not to evoke philosophical
normative debate, but to posit the presence and pressure of competition and cooperation between
individuals as topographical locators for the work of lawyers. Although the nature and modes
of the competition and cooperation can significantly affect, for example, the concentration of
lawyers affiliated with a particular unit of interest, discussion of the relationship between the
model and various interpretations of the societal dynamic lies outside the scope of this article.
59. See M. HORwiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860 passim
(1977) (early nineteenth century adoption of instrumental conception of law transformed law
into means of social control and change). Horwitz explains that American law moved to formalism
after 1850 as "the powerful groups in that society [came] to have a great interest in disguising
and suppressing the inevitable political and redistributive functions of law." Id. at 266.
60. See, e.g., F. RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! (2d ed. 1957).
61. See Carrington, supra note 48, at 7.
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Yet, each observation uses motivational and hierarchical terms to describe the role and effect of the lawyer amid the interactions of individuals, governments, and organizations. The professional roles of the
model offer descriptive, not prescriptive,a guidance by clarifying
lawyers' roles and providing an organization by which educational
decisions might be discussed.6
Lawyers, as they move among individuals, government, and organizations, consistently assume four distinct roles: relation-coordinator,
interpreter, representative, and resolver.6 In the first role, the lawyer
coordinates and influences relations among society's units of interest.
"Relations" refers to the interconnections between individuals and
governments and organizations through which each unit of interest
makes demands for limited space, knowledge, and resources.6
Lawyers, for example, design and operate the systematizing machinery of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Administrative Procedure
Act, and the Bankruptcy Code. The relational dimension of lawyers'

62. The descriptive generality of the roles discussed hereafter is an intentional attempt to
purge the normative tone of much legal skills discourse. Discussion of what lawyers should or
should not do inherently assumes that society needs lawyers and uses lawyers. How to define
society's "use," independent of lawyers' prescriptions, raises methodological problems answered
in this article by reference to lawyers' evaluation of the demands of their work, "demands"
made in some measure by the consumers of legal services. The extent to which the professional
roles should be doctrinally circumscribed to curb, for example, lawyers' self-interested drift
from serving societal needs, see, e.g., H. Kritzer, W. Felsteiner, A. Sarat, D. Trubek, The
Impact of Fee Arrangements on Lawyer Effort, Working Paper 1984-3, Disputes Processing
Research Program, University of Wisconsin Law School; or to regulate the execution of a role,
see infra note 112, though not within the scope of this article, would certainly be within the
scope of a legal skills education derived from the model of jurisprudence. See infra § V.
63. On the importance of models, see supra note 6. Dean Mudd also noted the inadequacy
of the Langdellian model, "Because thinking-like-a-lawyer is an inadequate frame of reference
to accommodate the complexity of lawyering, a new conceptual model is needed." Mudd, supra
note 6, at 203.
64. Soia Mentschikoff and Irwin Stotzky have described "three major functions of law:
dispute settlement, channeling and rechanneling behavior, and allocating the final say."
Mentschikoff & Stotzky, supra note 12, at 705. The focus here differs because the initial question
differs. This article inquires not as to the functions of 'law" vis-A-vis society but as to the
functions of any individual lawyer vis-A-vis society. The difference reflects a judgment that the
former inquiry will never be satisfactorily answered since "laws" cannot be observed. One can
only "see" what lawyers themselves are doing and study how "law" figures in their work.
65. Standing doctrine requires that status and treatment of natural objects be litigated
through humans who represent or share the interests of the natural objections. Christopher
Stone advances the creative and provocative argument that natural objects, long the object of
human demands and struggle, should have representation against humans. C. STONE, SHOULD
TREES HAVE STANDING: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NATURAL OBJECTs 11-26 (1974).
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work manifests an immediate, noteworthy consequence: the work of
lawyers is a human-based activity. As a painter renders a model, and
a musician arranges notes, so the lawyer is intimately concerned with
human beings. The lawyer assumes some quantum of responsibility
for the environmental demands and needs of people. "[T]he responsibility," according the Professor Noonan, "comes in the response to
other persons; it is the greater the more one is conscious . . .that
the action affects not a hypothetical 'A' but a real Helen Palsgraf. '"
In 1980, approximately 68 percent of the 542,205 licensed lawyers
67
in the United States were working in the private practice of law;
179,923 of these lawyers (33.2 percent of all lawyers) were in solo
practices.6 How do these people describe what they do? In the 1980
seminal study of the Chicago Bar more than two-thirds of the respondent lawyers described their law work as falling into one or more of
these seven areas: corporate, real estate, personal injury, trusts and
estates, tax, criminal, or family. 69 Summarizing the responsibilities
associated with one of these "areas" embodies the relational concept
with the daily concerns of a practicing lawyer.
"Corporate" law, as practiced, is something broader than the law
governing "the relationship of a corporation to its officers and upper
management and its shareholders ....-70 It includes all aspects of the
life of a corporation: contracts, labor relations, competitors, the market
place, taxes, and the regulations that govern its operations. 7 1 Conceptually fundamental to the practice and teaching of corporate law is
the fiction that the corporation is an entity, like an individual, with
its own rights 2 and obligations. The lawyer representing a corporation
represents that entity, not the individuals employed by the entity. 73
Similar descriptions of each field by which private practicing lawyers

66.

R.

NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW

67.

B.

CURRAN,

68.

Id. at 13.

xi (1976).

supra note 51, at 12.

69. F. ZEmANS & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note 15, at 72-73. "While only 15.5% (N = 542)
indicate that they devote their time exclusively to a single area of the law, most of the sample
limit their practices to a few substantive legal areas. Most do not cite more than three fields
." Id. at 71-72 (footnote omitted).

All 542 lawyers responding to the study "practice law" as defined by the authors: "[Ilt
seemed conceptually most sound to consider as practitioners those attorneys whose primany
role was the representation of the legal status of others." Id. at 18 (footnote omitted).
70. D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAw 11 (2d ed. 1979).
71. Id. at 11-12.
72. See, e.g., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1946) (corporation enjoys right of "people" to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures).
73. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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classify themselves demonstrates that lawyers work amid holders of
interest, structuring the lives of people and not things. This fact is
too frequently overlooked by educators and practitioners alike. 74
In addition to the 370,111 lawyers in private practice75 in 1980,
there were 19,160 lawyers in the judiciary 76 (27 percent of whom were
court officials or support personnel rather than judges-), 53,763
lawyers working in the government, 78 and 54,626 lawyers working for
private industry. 79 Another three and one-half percent of the 542,205
licensed lawyers worked for special interest groups, such as "unions,
professional associations, trade associations, fraternal societies, political action groups and religious organizations"; legal aid and public
defenders' offices; and in educational institutions."" These lawyers also
function as relation-coordinators. As judges, lawyers set and adjust
the balances between units of interest on a case-by-case basis.sl Government lawyers coordinate relations through direct and incidental
policy-making: "[P]olicy... is made through the drafting of legislation,
regulations, and executive orders; through interpretation of statutory
and administrative law; through reviewing of work done by bureaus
and divisions; and through the litigatory and administrative process."'
Llewellyn has summarized the work menu of "interested groups" with
a description equally applicable to their lawyers: "They 'see' bosses;
they persuade administrators; they lobby bills ... they discover barriers in the language of the Venerable Document, or in the cases
'under' it, and press those barriers upon the courts." 3

74. See T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 15, at 1-13; Zemans & Rosenblum,
supra note 15, at 137 (interpersonal skills essential to law practice not developed in law school);
cf. R. NOONAN, supra note 66, 19-20 (masking people through depersonification of law-rules).
75. B. CURRAN, supra note 51, at 13.
76. Id. at 16.
77. See id.
78. Government lawyers include those working in United States Attorneys' offices, state
and local prosecutors' offices, and public defenders. Id. at 17; cf. id. at 593-94 (public defenders
included within government classification only for purposes of comparison with earlier censuses).
79. Id. at 19.
80. Id. at 21. On the inclusion of public defenders in two categories, see supra note 78.
81. Whether an analytic positivist or realist or other, the observer of the judiciary must
note the profound effect that a single judicial decision can have upon disputants. See, e.g., S.
MILLER, THE GOOD MOTHER (1986) (fictional account of custody of only child awarded to
father based on judge's disapproval of mother's sexual permissiveness).
The inclusion of judges in the formulation of the model may be overly ambitious. Nevertheless,
because of conceptual similarity of their work, judges are included.
82.

V. COUNTRYMAN,

T.

FINMAN &

T.

SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY

49 (2d ed. 1976) (quoting BROWN, LAWYERS, LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE
(1948)).
83. K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 242 (1962). The essentiality of the relation-coordi-
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As relation-coordinators, lawyers not only work with human material, they must possess what Professors Mentschikoff and Stotzky
have called a "situational sense": "A lawyer in a shipping case, for
example, is less than helpful if he does not understand the industry,
its practices, and the various resolutions of disputes made in the past.
• . . Further, a lawyer must understand the makeup of the group

with which he deals, its goals, operations, and beliefs." A notable
aspect of this "situational sense" is time sensitivity. "Relations" are
constantly changing and changeable. The lawyer must simultaneously
consider arrangements between units of interest in the past, their
current status, and the potentialities."
In their second role, lawyers serve as interpreters; they "explain
or tell the meaning of: present in understandable terms." 86As interpreter the lawyer performs two primary functions on behalf of a unit of
interest:8 the lawyer assigns meaning and priority to information for
the purpose of locating a situation on the legal landscape, and translates both the information and meanings into a comprehensible and
usable form. Jurists generally recognize the importance of performing
this role in their work. Of the 542 respondents in Professors Zemans'
and Rosenblum's study of the Chicago bar, 86.6 percent rated as
"important" the "ability to understand and interpret opinions, regulations, and statutes." Clinical law students participating in a recent
study of professional skills noted the importance of explaining the
legal proceedings in nonlegal language. 9

nation role to lawyering is seen, too, in the work of lawyer legislators. The legislator formally

orders to the relationship between society's units of interest, requiring that he possess an
informed sensitivity to the units of interest and the limits of compromise and cooperation.
84. "A competent lawyer mijst, therefore, be a universalist." Mentschikoff & Stotzky, supra
note 12, at 716 (footnote omitted).
85. For evidence of lawyers engaged in time-dependent work, see generally Brown v. Board
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (separate but equal doctrine for public schooling rejected against
history of failure); Gideon v. Wainwright, 373 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel for indigent
criminal defendant imposed against demonstrated inadequacies of pro se representation); Javins
v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (implied warranty of habitability
judicially approved in light of history of landlord-tenant relations), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970).
86. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 632-33 (1985).
87. A unit of interest may or may not be a "client" in the traditional manner. As discussed
in the context of the third role, the jurisprudence model expands the representative role of
lawyers beyond a fee-paying or client-designated base. Therefore, the entity for whom a jurist
will interpret varies. See infra text accompanying note 100.
88. F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note 15, at 125.
89. J. BOLAND, supra note 37.
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As interpreters, lawyers rely heavily upon their own ability to
distill the ambiguity and uncertainty from foundational information
such as facts and law. Judges, who perhaps most apparently and
consciously serve in the interpreter role, experience the tension between the role pressure for explanation and the natural uncertainty
of facts. Consider, for example, Judge Angela Bartel's description of
what makes a case "hard" from her perspective as a Wisconsin trial
judge:
The greater the number of acceptable outcomes, the greater
the potential for uncertainty; the greater the number of potential outcomes, the more complex the process of alternate
hypothesis evaluation becomes - when the mind aches to resolution and harmony. External factors make cases "harder"
such as overzealous or uncontrolled advocacy, extraordinary
high [sic] public interest or visibility, extraordinarily impact
[sic] (social, monetary, freedom, or statutory or constitutional
validity), conflicts with co-ordinate branches of government.9
The difficulties experienced by trial judges in their evaluation of
information are inescapably intertwined with lawyering generally. The
"capacity to marshal facts and order them so that concepts can be
applied," for example, has been rated "important" to the practice of
the law by 91.6 percent of the respondents in Professors Zemans' and
Rosenblum's study.91 And "understanding the viewpoint of others to
deal more effectively with them," alternatively described as "effectively translating information and meanings to others," was thought
to be "important" by 76.4 percent of the respondents.R2 Professors
Austin Sarat and William Felstiner have chronicled both aspects of
the interpreter role in the work of a divorce attorney. The divorce
attorney "locates" his client's legal problem within a range of legally
available outcomes for domestic disputes and responds to the client's
need for explanation of procedures, rules, and court decisions.9 3

90. A. Bartell, Judicial Decision Making in the Trial Court 16 (Sept. 20, 1985) (unpublished
manuscript).
91. The importance of this aspect of practice cuts across areas of speciality and size of law
firm in which respondent was practicing. See F. ZENtANS & V. ROSENBLUAI, supra note 15,
at 9-13.
92. Id. at 125.
93. Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 50, at 99, 126. Sarat and Felstiner's prototypical lawyer
performs all four jurisprudential roles with a divorce client; the role of interpreter stands out,
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The third role assumed by lawyers, the representational role, is

the most familiar and widely acknowledged role.9 As representative,
the lawyer is restrained from pursuing personal ends in the lawyer's
own name. "Representative" is defined broadly to include standing or
acting for any of the units of interest previously discussed. A "representative" may be acting on behalf of the profession itself - an officer
of the court 95 - or on behalf of societal order as manifested in statements of law - a defender of justice. 96 Judges, legislators, and clientbased lawyers alike are expected to perform within the structure of
the representative roles. For example, in the case of Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie,9 the United States Supreme Court found that
Justice Embry of the Alabama Supreme Court had violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment by participating in the
decision of a case that "had the clear and immediate effect of enhancing
both the legal status and the settlement value of his own [separate
but similar] case."98 The judge's failure to recuse himself abrogated
his role as representative of the judiciary" in favor of self-promotion.
Dissension to the assertion that all lawyer's work is representative
can be anticipated. The skeptic's response is that lawyers merely assume the role as a safe shelter from which they effectively promote
their own interests. In this regard the practical model of jmisprudence
caps an important, political Pandora's box, the opening of which is

due in part to the singular focus upon the lawyer-client interaction and each participant's role
in the interaction. See id.
94. Indeed, Zemans & Rosenblum saw this role as that which most clearly differentiates
practitioners from other persons qualified to practice law (e.g., successful bar examinees, including judges, legal academicians, legislators, title examiners, corporate officers, and other administrative officers and managers): "Ultimately it seemed conceptually most sound to consider as
practitioners those attorneys whose primary role was the representation of the legal status of
others." F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note 15, at 18. This role was the sine qua non
of those lawyers included in the Zemans and Rosenblum study. Id.
95. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19, 7-39 (1976)

(duty of lawyer to the adversary system of justice);

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 1

(1976) ("judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary"); Nix v. Whiteside,
106 S. Ct. 988 (1986) (attorney's duty of loyalty to client is tempered by attorney's duty to
search for truth).
96. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281 (Page Supp. 1986) (lawyer appointed to
represent best interest of child).
97. 106 S. Ct. 1580 (1986).
98. Id. at 1586.
99. Judge Embry probably also breached governmental regulations of employee conflicts
of interest that apply widely throughout government. Such breaches are of a different nature,
however, subjecting the violator to disciplinary actions without necessarily vitiating the action
taken by the employee.
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outside the scope of this article. Preliminarily, the model frames actual
lawyering. Lawyers describe, perceive, and govern themselves as representatives of interests other than their own. If this description arises
from a self-interested artifice to safeguard the financial and social
secmity frequently found in lawyering, then discussion should consider
the utility and appropriate dimensions of the role, not its existence.100
If, on the other hand, lawyers broadly fail to perform effectively and
competently in this role, grounds for improved education and regulation emerge. In the meantime, one can observe that the lawyer as
representative is ubiquitous.
Eighty-two percent of all lawyers engage in a client-based practice. 1 Another nine percent of all lawyers work for the federal, state,
or municipal government. 10 Each of these attorneys takes an oath of
office, pledging to represent the interests of the governmental entity.
"On behalf of," "in the name of," and "for the good of' become part
of every lawyer's vocabulary before being licensed to practice. The
Code of Professional Responsibility, for example, warns the lawyer
to maintain a representative posture before a tribunal and not to
"assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the
guilt or innocence of an accused."1 Disciplinary action against lawyers°
failing to pursue or harming the interests of their clients abounds. 4
The Judicial Code of Ethics 05 and, in extreme cases, the United States
Constitution, 10 require judges to recuse themselves from cases in which
personal interest will determine the outcome.
Lawyers themselves express concern about functioning effectively,

100. See supra note 62. But see, e.g., F. RODELL, supra note 60 (discussing lawyers'
self-serving positioning for employment and status).
101. B. CURRAN, supra note 51, at 12 (counting all practitioners except judiciary and

government as client-based).
102. Id.
103. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR-7 106(C)(4) (1976).
104. See, e.g., Smiley v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 286 Ala. 216, 238 So. 2d 716
(1970); Paradisio v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 284 Ala. 450, 225 So. 2d 855 (1969);
In re Couser, 122 Ariz. 500, 596 P.2d 26 (1979); McMorris v. State Bar of Cal., 35 Cal. 3d 77,
672 P.2d 431, 196 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1983); Oliver v. State Bar of Cal., 12 Cal. 3d 318, 525 P.2d
79, 115 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1974); Colorado v. Forsyth, 187 Colo. 438, 534 P.2d 1210 (1975); Florida
Bar v. Dancu, 490 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1986); Florida Bar v. Mackenzie, 485 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1986);
In re Schuyler, 91 Ill. 2d 6, 434 N.E.2d 1137 (1982); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Williams,
479 So. 2d 329 (La. 1985); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Pollack, 279 Md. 225, 369 A.2d 61
(1977); In re Greer, 61 Wash. 2d 741, 380 P.2d 1330 (1983).
105. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1972).
106. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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sensitively, and professionally in their representative capacity.10 7 And
in a study of law students enrolled in a clinical course, the researcher
concluded that a primary attraction to clinical education was the student's interest in actual representation of clients.los Another study
concluded that the interest to represent a client, along with a desire
to influence society, may very well accompany the first-year law student to law school. 10 9
In the fourth and final role, all lawyers serve as resolvers, making
and facilitating decisions of resolution. "Resolution" is not merely a
decision of closure in a disputed matter. Lawyers play a significant
role in avoiding and defusing disputes through alternative dispute
resolution,1 ° counseling, and other actions designed to forestall the
eruption of a dispute.-11
Lawyering anticipates a conclusion, whether by way of judicial
decision, legislative enactment, or simply a signed, effective legal instrument."1 2 It is not enough for the lawyer to list ten options for the

107. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 15, at 129.
108. J. BOLAND, supra note 37, at 7.
109. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 15, at 102. The test group was very small,
only twelve freshmen and eight seniors from Valparaiso. Id.
110. The importance of the resolutional dimension of lawyering is reflected in the increased
use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, which arose from frustration with time delays
and the demands on resources of full adversarial proceedings. That the profession should be
actively increasing opportunities to resolve conflicts expeditiously demonstrates the profession's
recognition of and commitment to this role. See, e.g., Riskin, Mediation in the Law Schools,
34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 259 (1984).
111. Trubek, supra note 54, at 86. "Overall, we found that 71.8% of individuals with grievances complained to the offending party, and that a dispute arose in 63% of these situations.
Of these disputes, 11.2% resulted in a court filing." Id. Some educators have urged law students
and lawyers to prepare for and to assume a broader counseling function with clients. See, e.g.,
A. FREEMAN & H. WEIHOFEN, CLINICAL LAW TRAINING (1972). Lawyer as counselor could
warrant a fifth role in the model of jurisprudence if, for example, lawyers were both hired and
educated for counseling in its psychological and legal dimensions. See id. at 57-85 (chapter
entitled Psychologyfor Counselors). Currently, legal counseling consists primarily of the lawyer
as resolver conveying informational options available to a client within a demarcated doctrinal
framework.
112. Appropriate means and limits for "leading" a client to a resolution have been the
subject of scholarly debate. The lawyering model frames that debate as an issue of role rather
than as an issue of professional skill to be debated and decided by both the individual lawyer
and by the broader community. Restrictions on the role - such as requiring signed understanding
and consent by a client to an important legal decision - could be doctrinally imposed, shaping
the contours of the role through behavioral limitations on individual lawyers. As S. Macaulay
has observed, "Lawyer are selling services and they must try to persuade, trick or coerce
clients into accepting any service the lawyer is willing or able to provide." S. Macaulay, LawyerClient Interaction: Who Cares and How Do We Find Out What We Want to Know? Working
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resolution of a problem in the relations between an individual and
organization, or between an organization and the government. It is
not enough for the lawyer to assure the client that the list exhausts
all possibilities available to that client. A decision must be reached.
The lawyer must say, "I recommend option three to you with the
understanding that it is the most expensive." Or the lawyer must say,
"I cannot choose for you from this list. You must make the choice and
I will answer the questions that arise as you decide."
Lawyers recognize this role in the reliance of individuals, organizations, and government. More than eighty-eight percent of the respondents to Zemans' and Rosenblum's questionnaire designated "instilling
others confidence in you" as "important.' '13 In a recent study conducted
by Professors Sarat and Felstiner one lawyer 1 4 summarized his discomfort in the role:
[Y]ou can become a hypothetical maniac . . . [in] the practice
of law . . . for two reasons . . . . [Y]ou are kind of guarding

yourself from malpractice and you are also thinking, my God,
the one time I don't alert somebody she's going to walk out
the door and it's going to happen. And it happens just enough
to make you real sensitive."16

Similarly, a participant in a student study summarized the resolutional
aspect of lawyering in this way:
[I learned] just how important it is that this is a person's life
that you are dealing with. To go into a person's home and talk
to them about what happened and you or someone else is going
to make those decisions about what is going to happen to them
that they have no control over is kind of mindblowing. I think
that will6 be a good thing to always remember when you do
things."

These four roles performed by and expected of lawyers comprise
the professional self that a lawyer cultivates and manages, either
consciously or unconsciously, throughout a legal career. In the execu-

Paper 19844, Disputes Processing Research Program, University of Wisconsin Law School,
6-7; see supra note 62.
113. F. ZEIMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note 15, at 125.
114. For a judge's description of the resolver role, see A. BARTELL, supra note 90.
115. A. Sarat & W. Felstiner, Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office 23-24 (July 1985)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file ith Professor M. Murphy, University of Cincinnati College
of Law, by permission).
116. J. BOLAND, supra note 37, at 9.
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tion of roles, the lawyer draws upon an informational base of four
topical categories: "doctrine," "fact," "societal values," and "personal
self." Doctrine and facts represent generally understood concepts
within lawyering. These four categories constitute the second tier of
the model. Doctrine includes procedural, statutory, and common law.
Fact includes both situation-descriptive evidence and other significant
information. For example, fact includes peculiarities of a particular
forum or opposing counsel, or financial limitations of a client or community. Although treated as discrete for purposes of discussion, the
categories overlap at points. For instance, a judge's requirement that
the principals be present at a pretrial conference may be classified
both as "doctrine" and as "fact."
Societal values refer to those norms the lawyer perceives as the
standards of the social environment by which the lawyer and the issue
at hand will be judged, praised, or condemned. The lawyer need not
subscribe to these values personally, but may even think them unfounded and absurd. Nevertheless, the informational worth of societal
values is evidenced by the extent to which they presage the response
of others affected by a particular issue and inform lawyer activity. In
the latter manifestation, societal values color lawyers' evaluation of,
for example, issues of free speech"17 and criminal penalization,I" and
serve as explicit legal referents, as in obscenity law"19 and child custody

determinations. 120
Though "personal self" is a less acknowledged information base,
the private self of a lawyer interacts with the role demands of professional life.2 1 "Personal self' includes both innate and learned mecha-

117. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 20, 31 (1971) (first amendment as protection for explicitly and predominantly political
speech to promote discovery and spread of political truth).
118. See, e.g., Becker, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169 (1968) (description of optimal and minimal sanctions derived from economic analysis of crime

prevention).
119. "[O]bscenity is to be determined by applying 'contemporary community standards'...."
Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 15, 37 (1973). But see Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987)

(holding that third prong of Miller test - serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
-

should be based on reasonable person standard, not contemporary community standards).
120. See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.414 (Page Supp. 1985) (permanent termination
of parental rights appropriate if child is without "adequate parental care" and termination is in
child's "best interest").
121. R. Unger has articulated this duality as a primary characteristic of liberal psychology:
'The discomfort of life is a consequence of the relentless battle these two aspects of life must
wage against one another ....
[Tihe self flees constantly from the public to the private.. .. "
R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 59-60 (1975). M. Meltsner has noted the detrimental
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nisms that a lawyer employs consciously and unconsciously in the
professional roles.12 In the model, the personal self is the jurist's
internal informational source, which if consciously developed, is an
ever increasing and maturing resource in effective lawyering performance. It reflects a personal value system, experience, and innate
qualities like judgment, intuition, and character. It informs the lawyer
of the potential response to role behavior. For example, a lawyer
might consider whether societal condemnation or praise is important,
whether performance will be diminished because of antipathy to a
client, whether the tedium of a particular matter is tolerable, and
whether a yearning to be a poet should impel abandonment of the
legal profession.
The personal self wields significant influence upon the execution
of the four professional roles and the development of work patterns
responsive to client and professional expectations. Control of the "personal self' inheres in the development of a "professional self." The
ability, for example, to repress a private repulsion in the face of client
conduct or to refrain from crying or raging when rebuked by an ill-tempered judge requires separation and suppression of the personal self
in deference to professional roles. 12
Lawyers function in a professional role as relation-coordinator, interpreter, represenative, and resolver. Their tools, items of doctrinal,
factual, societal, and personal information, inform their behavior in
role. It is against this two-tiered practical model of jurisprudence that
the "skills" of lawyers, by which information is transformed into role
activity, are discussed.

IV.

A THEORY OF LEGAL SKILLS

Lawyering has been analogized to audience performance in its demands upon the lawyer-performer.12 4 Adopting the metaphor, the

consequences of the private-professional schism for some lawyers, particularly the "suppression
of feeling" to facilitate identifying "with our client's point of view ....

"

Meltsner, Whitwr

Legal Education, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 579, 585-86 (1985).
122. The authors prefer to think of the process as conscious with unconscious factors, but
it is probably analytically identical to say that the process is part conscious and part unconscious.
Our statement simply provides for an analysis that assumes that lawyers in their professional
role are conscious of the effects of the psychological forces comprising their "own interest" such as fees, effort allocation among clients and on-going relationships with adversaries. See S.
MACAULAY, supra note 112, at 7-9.

123. Education in separating the professional and personal selves occurs subtly from the
first day of law school when the student learns to favor the broadly applicable statement over
the anecdotal, the reasoned over the emotional, and the third person over the first.
124. Mudd, supranote 6, at 201. "The word 'performance' implies three elements: an actor,
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model of jurisprudence described in section III accounts for the actor,
the knowledge, and the audience expectation in the "performance" of
lawyering. But without skills to transform roles and information into
action, the lawyer's performance remains fragmented and seemingly
undecipherable. Current pedagogies of legal skills have done little to
cohere curricular elements into performance-oriented education, opting
instead to characterize skills as "activity" severable from the lawyer's
full information base. Responding to the theoretical flaws and consequences discussed in section II and drawing upon the practical model
of jurisprudence developed in section III, the alternative theory of
legal skills presented in this section depicts the formative interaction
of professional roles and information in the production of unique legal
skills.
Llewellyn suggested that essential "lawyering skills" are rein'
vented daily as situations pressure people to perform "law jobs." ,
Rutter argued that common legal skills underlying lawyers' activities
could and should be identified and taught. 126 The practical model of
jurisprudence spans these two fundamental observations to identify
both the universality and uniqueness of lawyers' professional skills.
As generalists, lawyers employ "precedent skills," ubiquitously used
skills such as extension of a rule by analogy, 127 ends-means thinking,128
and interpersonal skills. 1 9 Contrasting precedent skills, the shibboleth
"like a lawyer" is borrowed from the pervasively acknowledged skill
"thinking like a lawyer" to reference those attributes that distinguish
legal skills.130

an action, and a resulting product, which sometimes, for instance as in the case of a dance, is
the action itself." Id.
125. See supra note 1.
126. See supra note 5.
127. See supra note 1.
128. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 614-15.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29 & 34-37.
130. In "thinking like a lawyer," educators have searched for the intellectual identifiers
that would facilitate the teaching of this universally approved "legal skill."
[C]onsider a description of the cognitive elements of "thinking like a lawyer."
Specifying that "thinldng like a lawyer" is no more nor less than vocabulary, case
analysis, manipulation of rule systems, and argumentation helps the teacher in
designing a course or curriculum and the student in learning within the course of
curriculum. At the general level this provides a guide to the teaching of skills
considerably more explicit and helpful than the traditional approach of repetitive,
nonexplicit experience with Socratic dialogue.
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Legal education consciously presupposes the presence of certain
precedent skills - skills thought foundational to undertaking lawyering. The Law School Admissions Test (LSAT), for example, attempts
to identify and measure some of these precedent skills, such as use
of precedent and reconciliation of results. It has long been recognized
that to "think like a lawyer" a student must not only assimilate a
significant amount of raw information, but also be able to apply syllogistic reasoning. While a lawyer must know or learn how to use law
digests, computerized research systems, and case reporters in order
to identify "doctrine," neither syllogistic thinking nor library research
are skills peculiar to lawyers. Political scientists and economists, for
example, may both rely upon the same research and analytic skills.
Lawyers' work draws upon other precedent skills obviously not
evaluated by the LSAT, such as interpersonal skills. Throughout a
legal career, the lawyer will be in contact with human beings. Thus,
interpersonal skills will affect the lawyer's ability to perform, for example, as interpreter for the client whom the lawyer will have to question
and counsel. Likewise, a lawyer will implement precedent skills to
speak in public, negotiate a disputed point to a conclusion, elicit information through direct questioning, and identify information needed to
proceed effectively in the lawyer's work. The practical model of jurisprudence suggests that this incomplete list of human skills, as essential
as they may be to the effectiveness of lawyers, are but preliminaries
in the acquisition of professional lawyering skills.
Performing "like a lawyer" requires lawyers to adapt precedent
skills to role-complying behavior. Legal skills are manifested most
fundamentally in filling the units of information and in using the informational resources. These two dimensions of legal skills, "fill" and
"use," represent a primary division in a taxonomy of legal skills.
Whether the legal skill is a "fill" or "use" skill, both the other units
of information and the professional roles exert operative effect on skill
performance.
To illustrate, consider "fact-gathering like a lawyer," filling the
fact unit of information in preparation for any lawyering activity. 131

Feinman & Feldman, Achieving Excellence: Mastery Learningin Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 528, 532 n.11 (1986).
The activity flurry associated with other "legal skills" has, perhaps, distracted legal educators
from similar discussions of the intellectual components of all legal skills. Based on the discussion
of legal skills herein, to the above description of "thinking like a lawyer" must be added "professional roles."
131. This illustration is not intended to identify "fact-gathering" as a discrete subject area.
Just as instruction in "thinking like a lawyer" suffuses the curriculum, so too instruction in
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As the model suggests, the legal skill is not a raw accumulation of
every possible fact logically related to a particular interest, dispute,
or decision. In a professional role, the lawyer will call upon the fact
unit, simultaneously referring to the information contained in each of
the other units. The decision, therefore, how to fill the fact unit will
be guided by such doctrinal directions as the need to complete the
financial statement required in a bankruptcy proceeding or to demonstrate changed circumstances in seeking the modification of a child
contained in each unit informs and checks
custody decree. Information
13 2
the filling of other units.
Lawyers' professional roles likewise transmute precedent skills to
fit the unique demands of lawyering. Researching domestic and foreign
law, identifying local court and business customs, and distilling a case
holding from the written court opinion are precedent skills useful in
filling the doctrine unit of information. Similarly, creation of facts,
recreation of facts, and language characterization of information may
be essential in filling the fact unit of information. Nevertheless, no
jurist proceeds to research all of the law or to recreate all of the
relevant facts. The lawyer circumscribes his inquiries by identifying
and pursuing goals and strategies consonant with the lawyer's professional role.
To identify the independent influences of the professional role and
the informational content of other units of information on the precedent
skills of "filing the fact unit" is not to imply that the relationship
between the activity and the role or between the units of information
within the context of the activity constitute discrete legal skills. To
the contrary, the legal skill of fact-gathering cannot be fragmented
into precedent skills, roles, and other units of information; even the

other legal skills may be introduced. Although pedagogical issues are clearly implicated by the
model of jurisprudence, this article does not attempt to prescribe or recommend a prototypical
legal skills curriculum. See infra § V.
132. An interactive relationship between the doctrinal unit and the societal value unit in
composing an advocacy brief is apparent in Anthony Lewis' description of the work of Arnold
Fortas and Porter in Gideon v. Wainwright:
Bright young men break [the issue] down into tiny components ... they probe,
imagine, cover every exit. Then, from this jumble of material, a skilled lawyer
creates a legal work of art, choosing a coherent form for his argument and
A direct question
ruthlessly eliminating all that is extraneous to that form ....
- such as "Should Clarence Earl Gideon have had a lawyer at his trial?" - has

become a much more sophisticated constitutional conception, not necessarily more
remote from life but richer in its reflection of history and philosophy and judicial
attitudes.
A. LEwIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 120-21 (1966).
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roles and other units of information interact in the execution of legal
fact-gathering. Consider the initial interview of a criminal defendant
accused of murder. Based on the information known to the lawyer
through the police report, the lawyer anticipates that the defendant
might claim that the decedent held a weapon at the time the defendant
was seen stabbing the decedent. Is there to be a self-defense claim?
How does the lawyer "fact-gatherer" answer the question? Based
upon the legal standard, the lawyer appreciates that, for example,
the self-defense claim might fail if the defendant could have safely
retreated. The defendant may not know about the obligation to retreat;
additionally, the defendant may be quite receptive to even subtle
"coaching" from the lawyer on the point. ' The lawyer proceeds to
adapt the precedent skill - fact-gathering by interviewing - to meet
the doctrinal dimension of the query and, similarly, to meet the contours of the role. How the lawyer phrases the question, whether the
lawyer leads the defendant or uses a contemptuous tone, will depend,
in part, on whether the lawyer is the defense attorney, the prosecutor
or, even, an attorney for a codefendant.
Yet, even as the doctrine unit and professional role shape the
interviewing skill, the doctrine and personal self units are shaping the
professional role. The defense lawyer, for example, is familiar with
the Code of Professional Responsibility, requiring lawyers to report
perjury to the court, and the Supreme Court's endorsement of such
reporting requirements. 134Personally, the lawyer prefers representing
"innocent" clients over "guilty" clients. The defense lawyer might ask,
"You couldn't have run away from this guy safely, could you?" Alternatively, in deference to his legal and ethical constraints, the defense
lawyer may ask, "Can you tell me what you were thinking about when
you first saw the decedent?" The legal skill used by the lawyer in this
interview combines knowledge, audience expectations, and personal
pressures'33 in a moment of performance.

133. The defendant may simply not remember clearly what options were available to him
given the likely emotional intensity of the encounter. See E. LoFTus, MEMORY, SURPRISING
NEW INSIGHTS INTO How WE REMEMBER AND WHY WE FORGET 77-84 (1980).
134. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
135. Teaching a student to "fill" the personal self unit of information "like a lawyer" in any
fact specific situation threatens the privacy of the student to the extent that the teaching
methodology contemplates student revelation of personal information. Additionally, such instruction raises concerns regarding the qualifications of law faculty to teach a subject matter in which
they have had little, if any, education. Direct "personal self' education may not, however, be
necessary since professional role education requires students to segregate professional and personal issues.
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"Use" legal skills, such as legal argument, negotiations, and counseling, 13 6 are similarly sculpted from precedent skills by the simultaneous pressures of the informational units and professional roles. And,
like "fill" legal skills, the dominating influences on the execution of
any particular lawyering activity can vary through the conscious, decisional selection of the lawyer or through inattention. Clearly, lawyers
would not, for example, conduct the initial interview of the criminal
defendant described above in any uniform manner.
Variations in the application of a legal skill may be traced to differences in roles, in reality and conceptually, 3 7 in doctrinal and factual
knowledge, in abilities in interpersonal communication, and in values.
But variations may also be attributable to ignorance or misunderstanding of the nature of legal skills. Through legal skills education that
contextually places lawyering activity amid roles and information,
lawyers can learn to identify and select consciously for themselves the
informational base and purpose of their behavior. Current skills education too frequently fails to acknowledge the panoply of influences
that produce lawyering performance, leaving the student unprepared
to plan and control professional activity. 138
The theory of lawyering skills derived from the practical model of
jurisprudence militates in favor of redesigning professional skills education, however circumscribed, to stress not the activity of the lawyer
but the effect of the lawyer's roles on the identification, accumulation,
relation, and use of information and the adaptation of precedent skills
to the professional role demands of lawyers. The pedagogical issues
raised by adjusting the purpose and focus of professional skills education are the subject of section V.

136. The practical overlap between "fill" skills and "use" skills is evident in, for example,
the typical task of counseling a client where the lawyer both defines the factual perimeters of
the issue and invokes their significance to direct the client. See Sarat & Felstiner, supra note
50, at 125.
137. The contours, for example, of the representative role of lawyers for criminally charged
juveniles have undergone a doctrinal change as a result of In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Whether lawyers practicing juvenile law prior to Gault have conceptually adjusted their role is
a distinct question.
138. This failure occurs in skills courses that emphasize, for example, precedent skills
without relation to doctrinal information or professional role, and in clinical courses that emphasize the lawyering activities of a substantive area without addressing use of legal skills in
other substantive areas of practice. See supra text accompanying notes 23-37. The young lawyer,
therefore, engaging in lawyering activity, unaware of the full informational base, is unable to
manage the decisionmaking required by the professional roles. It can hardly be surprising if
the "audience" finds the beginner's "performance" wanting.
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V.

PEDAGOGICAL ISSUES

From this alternative theory of legal skills flows a legal skills
pedagogy designed to enable students and lawyers to control and
synthesize information and their professional roles. Three immediate
educational objectives follow: to identify and teach (1) how to define
the contours of the professional roles; (2) how to assess the relative
weight of information bearing upon any lawyer activity; and (3) how
to transmute precedent skills into legal skills. Students who can conceptually appreciate, if not practice, these three tasks have the intellectual tools for performance. How and by whom such objectives can
be met are questions fully answerable only with further study. 139
Employing a legal skill requires, first, that the lawyer consciously,
intellectually, and practically appreciate the professional roles of relation-coordinator, interpreter, representative, and resolver. These roles
embody both the expectations of the audience and the thematic "meaning" of the lawyer's work. They are not, however, static or fixed. The
lawyer must know how to define the professional roles. The contours
of the role, both in reality and ideality, shift, like any subjective
perception, with changes in doctrinal, factual, societal, and personal
considerations. As Professor Shaffer has illustrated:
The moral inheritance we have as American lawyers . . . includes dissenters ... who ... do not find, in American legal
ethics a trustworthy commitment either to the rule of law or
the principle that a responsible lawyer works within the system
. .. . Some of these dissenters offer . . . that clients . . .
are more important than institutions . . . [and] than abstract
and official
ideas and that friendship is more important than
40
justice.1

139.

As C. Menkel-Meadow has observed,
As an instructor and practitioner, the clinician has a unique opportunity to study
the legal profession as an ethnomethodologist - that is, a participant observer
. [and] a rich opportunity for a systematic behavioral examination of the
...
participants in and the structure of the legal system.
Menkel-Mleadow, supra note 4, at 572. By tethering skills education to the practice of law,
research on these educational objectives can be conducted through studies of practicing lawyers.
Research on how sklls are learned, however, can only be conducted through studies of students
(or laNyers) who are, in fact, learning. For these reasons, the clinical educator is ideally situated
to further an understanding of both how lawyers employ legal skills in performance and how
students acquire them.
140.

Shaffer, The Ethics of Dissent and Friendship in the American Professions, 88 W.

VA. L. REv. 623, 638 (1986).
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Second, all legal skills require the lawyer to assess and assign
relative weight to the information upon which the lawyer's behavior
is based. 141 Students of lawyering must become cognizant of the wealth
and diversity of information and their control over its use. Finally,
all lawyering activity incorporates and changes precedent skills
through an expansion of information and assumption of professional
roles.'4 The interactive dynamic of roles and information must be
consciously appreciated if legal skills are to be learned rather than
fortuitously acquired.
That law students can arrive at their final semester of law school
without having "learned" these three dimensions of lawyering performance was suggested in a study of law students enrolled in a live-client
clinical course at the University of Cincinnati.14 3 The students were
asked to comment on their experiences as guardians ad litem for
children appearing in Juvenile Court. The students repeatedly reflected on their personal adjustments to the demands of the lawyer's
professional roles, roles which they assumed with case responsibilities:
[Y]ou can't reinforce [sic] your values on other people. You
got to accept them [sic] they are. You really have to change
yourself and try to understand them and know you can't change
the world.'"
From dealing with the parents, I realize that people are
different and that I am not going to be dealing with other
lawyers and people will not understand the legalese that is
used . . . it's important to learn how to 4 portray your role to
people in the best light that is truthful.'
Probably, good lawyers don't always tell the whole truth.
They don't lie but they don't tell everything. They don't help

141. This assessment process is similar to but broader than the informational assessment
performed by a lawyer as interpreter for a client. To locate a client's situation, for example,
on a legal "map" requires a balancing of information for the purpose of, perhaps, advising the
client. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
142. The interpersonal skills used in a friendship or on a sports team may not be fully
appropriate for a judge or divorce lawyer in a professional role. Similarly, public speaking skills
developed on a debate team or as a political candidate must be tailored, for example, to the
constraints of the appellate courtroom.
143. J. BOLAND, supra note 37, at 7-11. The clinic was offered in the spring semester,
1985, to third-year law students. Of the ten students enrolled, nine were in their final semester
of law school; one student was on "flex time" requiring completion of one additional semester.
144. Id. Data filesfWT.
145. Id. Data files/KK.
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you out as much as you think they should if it is going to hurt
their case, it doesn't mean they're not a good lawyer, it might
146
mean that they're better.
I guess I never realized how much involvement we really
had. We have pretty much responsibility. We don't have ultimate, but we talk to these people. I guess I didn't realize the
7
amount of personal involvement.14
Implicit in these students' comments is a nascent understanding of
the professional roles of relation-coordinator, interpreter, representative, and resolver, respectively. While the students do not characterize
their experiences with the terminology of professional roles, they do
recognize the influence of professional expectations in forming behaviors not previously apparent to them. As the researcher concluded,
these clinical students "gained some insights into their role respon'
sibilities as lawyers. 14
The informational assessment and preparation required to perform
their roles also impressed the study group in their evaluation of their
clinical learning experiences:
You go into the interview with the bright idea that you are
going to find out everything that you need to know, which you
think you do after you talk to the first person, but then you
talk to the next person who saw the same thing and you get
a different story. After you've done that four or five times,
you realize that you are going to have to look at everything
and make your own decisions . . . so you can't really go in
with anything pre-conceived, you've just got to take
each situ149
ation, each interview and weigh what you've got.
There are different ways to approach cases and maybe the
whole process. You never really know what kind of atmosphere
you are going to have to deal with, whether it is to be really
adversarial or more conversational so you just have to prepare
with what you have so that you can deal with any situation
that comes up.1 5°
Similarly, students acknowledged that the assessment process required a factual inquiry that cannot be entrusted to others.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 13.
at 9.
at 11.
at 10.
Data ffies/WT.
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When I leave [an interview] I learn how I wish I had asked a
question .... I think I'm learning what to say and what not
to say and how to say it .... Another thing I think that I
learned too - it was real hard - I trusted so much and I

really didn't question what anybody told me. I think I learned
maybe not a good thing but maybe I shouldn't trust so much.
Of course people are telling me what they want me to hear
..

.

which kind of bothered me because I feel like I am a

better judge of character than that but 151
I guess that did teach
me not to take things quite so literally.
Their responsibilities in identifying, valuing, and using the informational resources in their professional capacities were a primary area
of performance apparently unanticipated by these students. 15 2 "They
moved away from interpreting information in a casual, everyday manner toward interpreting information through the many different perspectives uncovered during their investigations.''
Finally, a certain perplexity over the nature of "skills" used to
develop cases is reflected in one student's struggle to explain the
interviewing experience:
I would say on interviewing that I couldn't point to a single
skill that I picked up . . . in a sense this didn't seem like

professional interviewing. We were more fact finding than anything. Maybe that is what interviewing is. We basically sat
down and talked to these people. We saw how they felt. This
was a delicate situation when we asked them what should be
done. It wasn't adversarial interviewing. It certainly wasn't
cross examination. That is a different sort of interviewing
skill.15

The study findings suggest that these students' clinical experience
may have been their first exposure to the three intellectual bases
identified here as foundational to the development of legal skills. 1 5

Id. at 10-11.
152. Initially, the researcher had elicited from the students what they hoped to learn in
the clinical course. "[Tihey were drawn to the course because it offered the chance for real
work in a courtroom setting and to learn the skills related to being an effective lawyer." Id.
at 6. They did not, however, offer any specifics. Based on his evaluation of the students'
assessment of what they learned in the course, the researcher concluded that "important insights
into their socialization as lawyers" dominated their experiences. Id. at 13.
153. Id. at 11.
154. Id. Data files/GJ.
155. The study was not designed to test either the validity or pedagogy of legal skills
derived from the model of jurisprudence. In fact, the research results suggested the primacy
151.
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However, the legal curriculum and the professional skills curriculum,
specifically, has not been designed to equip students with broadly
applicable and replicative legal skills. Legal education does introduce
the student to new precedent skills, such as legal research or syllogistic
thinking, and it builds upon previously acquired precedent skills, such
as public speaking or descriptive writing. However, legal education
has not traditionally exposed students to, for example, the formative
effect of roles and information on the use of precedent skill. Thus,
while a course in interviewing directs the students' attention to the
development and refinement of interpersonal skills, such courses rarely
explore forming and altering interviewing approaches based upon doctrinal needs or concerns. 5 6 Such courses also rarely explore employing
suggestive interviewing techniques7 both to fill the fact informational
unit and in response to the professional roles as representative and
resolver.
A legal skills curriculum based on the practical model of jurisprudence has three essential characteristics. First, students are taught
the nature of legal skills, including the interaction of roles and information. Second, "skills" courses, however circumscribed, focus on the
impact of lawyers' roles and information on the use of precedent skills,
not on precedent skills acquisition or refinement. Legal skills courses
neither distortingly de-emphasize the importance of one or more units
of information.1, nor exaggerate the prominence of precedent skills
such as interpersonal skills. 159 Third, legal skills instruction illuminates
the interaction of roles, information, and precedent skills to facilitate
student replication outside the course and law school. This characteristic requires that students perform as lawyers.

of professional role in lawyering performance and the inadequacy of skills theories that fail to

equip students for role performance generally. Additionally, the results, as suggested in the
student comment regarding "interviewing," challenged the conceptualizing of skills as discrete,
physical activities. The extent to which students may learn a legal skills foundation in a non-clinical methodology will be the subject of future study.
156. See supra note 138. Materials do explore altering styles in response to the type of
client. This is primarily an interpersonal skills question, recognizing that efficacy of interviews

varies with personality types.
157. See E. LOFTUS, supra note 133, at 149-69.
158. The de-emphasis on fact information in typical doctrinal courses with a concomitant
reliance on appellate reasoning has been criticized as tending to warp the student's perspective
of the relative relation between fact and law. Rutter, supra note 5, at 316-18.
159. Gross student deficiencies in precedent skills raise a separate issue. Remedial instruction in interpersonal relations, public speaking and goal-setting appear to be a logical corollary

to the typical response for inadequacies in writing and reading.
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Assume, for example, that the beginning lawyer in section II had
never received instruction in law school on how to draft a contract.
Assume also that the lawyer's first client has requested the lawyer
to draft a contract. Educated now in legal skills, aware of the professional roles the lawyer serves with the client, and alert to the informational based upon which to draw, the lawyer can employ "fill" skills
for doctrina1'6 and factual 6l informational gathering. The model provides a framework for the lawyer to recognize both areas of knowledge
and, more importantly, areas of lack of knowledge. Whether the lawyer
should draft this contract or whether the draft will be of any quality
are questions left to the lawyer's control, but questions legal education
has prepared the lawyer to answer.
While this article advocates a legal skills theory derived from the
practical model of jurisprudence, it does not attempt a description or
implementation of a plan for a legal skills curriculum. Too little is
known to recommend any one method for teaching even the intellectual, much less practical, foundation of legal skills. Should legal skills,
such as "thinking like a lawyer," "interviewing like a lawyer," or
"fact-gathering like a lawyer," be the focus of a "skills" course? Should
legal skills be integrated into the more traditional doctrinal concentrations? What type of educator is best equipped to teach the legal skills?
What, for example, is the significance of the educator's own experience
in functioning within professional roles? To what extent should precedent skills be part of the law school curriculum?
At a minimum, the curriculum should offer students considerable
exposure to the professional roles, the creation and use of informational
resources, and the adaptation of precedent skills and performance
opportunities in which some number of legal skills are practiced. Students might learn legal skills in a variety of effective ways. To illustrate, consider how to teach "fact-gathering like a lawyer." Three
possibilities are immediately obvious: a lecture describing the skill,
including the significance of lawyers' roles, with problems asking the
student to identify what facts the student would seek to put in the
unit; a simulation exercise through which the student prepares an
investigation plan and perhaps conducts a witness interview; or an
actual clinic case for which a student must conduct a factual investigation.
Resources and other teaching objectives or interests may predis-

160.
books.
161.

E.g., library research, conversations with experienced contract lawyers, and area form
E.g., client interview and telephone call to seller.
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pose a faculty to one method over another. But there is very little
empirical basis that clearly recommends one methodology. In this regard, the practical model of jurisprudence can only direct thinking
about alternative methods of teaching legal skills, and moreover,
suggest a structure for validating the efficacy of a teaching methodology.

Alternative designs for legal skills education must compete with
the elemental nature of modern legal education and a current skills
focus on lawyering activity. The model can help focus discussion of
how to circumscribe and teach legal skills. Consider, for example, the
feasibility of offering no traditional "skills" courses such as Interviewing, Counseling, and Negotiations. Alternatively, faculty could agree
to add to their substantive courses simulations of a lawyering activity
in which lawyers in their field frequently engage. Upper level courses
in Lawyers' Professional Roles- and Lawyers' Informational Base
would be prerequisite to a live or simulation "performance" clinic.
Precedent skills could be supplemented by optional mini-courses. Such
an array of courses and course experience promises students fuller
exposure to all of the ingredients of lawyering without fragmenting
the work beyond recognition and recall.
Student opportunity to perform is an essential component in a legal
skills curriculum based on the practical model of jurisprudence. Performance, assuming professional roles and facing the audience, offers an
essential educational culmination in which legal skills are activated to
transform information in the service of professional roles. In addition,
this environment is cushioned for initial performance anxiety and errors. For what purpose was the time of learning if not to perform?
"Attention to the performer or even to the act of performing is incomplete unless attention is also given to the final product."'1
VI.

CONCLUSION

Either a reorganization of current professional skills courses or an
overhaul in the medium by which legal skills are taught must follow
a decision to abandon Langdellian elementalism in legal skills theory.

162. Professor Murphy offered such a course during the Spring Semester, 1987. While the
students simulated various lawyering activities (client and witness interviews, negotiations, etc.)
class readings and discussions focused the students on why they made particular decisions
regarding how to proceed (or not to proceed) in the simulation. This emphasis was furthered
by the use of non-legal simulations, against which the students could contrast their professional
role decisions. The course was highly successful.
163. Mudd, supra note 56, at 202.
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Legal skills will be isolated in a curricular corner only so long as its
theoretical base spreads no further. In answer to Professor Rutter's
assertions that legal skills share intellectual rooting, the practical
model of jurisprudence offers an alternative theory of legal skills that
blends lawyers' professional roles, their precedent skills, and information into the controlled activity by which they serve society.
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